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Abstract
The use of so-called cyber weapons is becoming an increasingly common aspect of
modern rivalries. The relatively low costs, reduced barriers of entry and difficulties in detection
are said to make cyber attacks an attractive option for both state and non-state actors. While there
is extensive analysis and writing about specific cyber incidents - which has generated some
common ideas about the reasons why states conduct them – there is very little quantitative
analysis available to support any theories about use or predict future action, despite the growing
importance of the cyber domain. This thesis seeks to help fill that gap.
By using multi-variable regression analysis on a dataset that includes 77 cases of
interstate rival dyads and eleven variables, I test three theories about the rivalry conditions under
which states are most likely to initiate a cyber operation. I argue that this is most likely to
happen when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high; or when there is
significant economic and military asymmetry within the dyad; or when the two rivals are
interconnected through trade or bilateral agreements. The empirical analysis is supplemented by
two case studies that focus on China and the United States, and China and Japan, respectively.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The use of so-called cyber weapons is becoming an increasingly common aspect of
modern rivalries. The relatively low costs, reduced barriers of entry and difficulties in detection
are said to make cyber attacks an attractive option for both state and non-state actors. There is a
growing literature about the impact of cyber conflict on international relations and its
implications for national security, national boundaries, the ever expanding role of non-state
actors and public-private sector collaboration. For many states, gaining an offensive capability in
the cyber realm is rapidly becoming a priority. A 2011 survey by the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) showed that 68 of the 193 UN Member States had cyber
security programmes and that 32 of those states included cyber warfare in their military planning
and organization. There are now several documented cases of hostile state-to-state cyber
operations using tactics such as distributed denials of service, intrusions, sabotage, website
defacement and worms and viruses.
Yet while it’s clear that many states are becoming eager to establish capacity in this
arena, both offensive and defensive, and that the effects of a full blown attack could be crippling,
the general trend has been to engage in mild or moderate operations that cause headaches of
frustration rather than serious damage to the victim state. Is this trend likely to continue? How
can the international community become better placed to respond to the unique challenges of the
cyber environment?
This thesis seeks to supplement what is already known and documented about instances
of cyber weapons use by looking more closely at the conditions under which states use them and
the dynamics of the rivalries in which they have been used. While there is extensive analysis and
writing about specific cyber operations – that have generated some common ideas about the
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reasons why states conduct them – there is very little quantitative analysis available to support
any theories about use or predict future action. Yet as more and more states choose to develop
capacity in this area, the need for such understanding will also increase. The same will be true of
the calls for regulation of cyber warfare, which can only be effective if they are based on
accurate patterns of and reasons for use, rooted in a solid understanding of what the political
obstacles are. In order for the international community to address legal and policy gaps in a
meaningful way, and while the technology is still emerging, it is helpful to have a clearer
understanding of what motivates states to use cyber technology in a hostile or antagonistic way
against their rivals. Current patterns of use are beginning to create new behavioral norms that are
so far largely tolerated or accepted but that also reflect the many gaps and grey areas in
international law with respect to interstate cyber warfare.
The primary research question that this thesis will answer is: what are the rivalry dynamics
that cause a cyber interaction between two states? In the course of answering this question the
following additional research questions will also be examined:


Does the intensity of a rivalry impact the likelihood of a cyber operation taking place?



Do states only initiate cyber operations against rivals or opponents who are economically
weaker?



Do states only initiate cyber operations against rivals or opponents who are militarily
weaker?



Are states more or less likely to use cyber weapons against a rival with whom they are
closely interconnected through bilateral treaties or trade dependency?

Based on the learning that emerges from addressing the above questions, the thesis will also
address the following:


How are states using cyber technology as a weapon against their rivals and to
accomplish what types of goals?
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What are the major challenges that policy makers face in order to regulate the use of
cyber technology when intended as a weapon?



What regional instruments, common positions or codes of conduct currently exist to
guide state policy on ‘cyber warfare’?
As stated earlier, the majority of hostile cyber activity among rival states has not been as

severe as it could be. This suggests that rivals are so far using cyber technology in a manner
consistent with how they normally interact and that many rivals have not even engaged with one
another in this way. I argue here that there exists a higher level of intensity among the dyads
where there has been cyber activity (cyber dyads) than among those where no such activity has
taken place (non-use dyads) because as intensity increases, so too does the level of antagonistic
behaviour and potential reasons to engage in a hostile cyber operation.
It is often said that what makes cyber use attractive to smaller states are the relatively low
costs and barriers to entry. The logic follows that it should be possible for states to initiate an
operation against larger or more powerful opponents using cyber technology. Yet the most
severe cyber operations on record were conducted against states that were significantly militarily
and economically weaker than those attacking them and the most prolific users of cyber weapons
continue to be economically developed states that also have strong militaries. Therefore, I predict
greater disparity between the use dyads than the non-use dyads represented by a high degree of
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad. In addition, I expect that the dyads that have
experienced a cyber event will be more interconnected through trade and bilateral treaties. My
rationale is that in spite of their economic or other closeness, these states are still rivals, seeking
to find an advantage over the other. Yet using other means of warfare or applying methods such
as sanctions present challenges to pursuing those advantages. As such, a cyber operation which is
easier to hide and less physically damaging or morally unacceptable presents a viable option.
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Based on the above, which is predicated both on what is known about how cyber
technology has been used to date, as a ‘weapon’, and also about the behavior of rivals, my
hypothesis includes three arguments. I propose that states are likely to initiate a cyber dispute or
incident against a rival when:
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high;
Hypothesis 2: When there is economic and/or military asymmetry within the dyad;
Hypothesis 3: When the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral
agreements.
The dependent variable is a cyber incident or dispute, a term that will be defined in
Chapter Three. There are three variables that support the hypotheses above: intensity of the
rivalry; military and economic asymmetry; and the level of interconnectedness. The thesis
further explores three other variables: the possession of nuclear weapons by any of the two states
in the dyad; the location of the rivals within the same geographic region or not; and sharing or
not sharing the same civilization type. A more detailed explanation of how these variables are
measured and defined is outlined in Chapter Three.
This thesis will utilize a regression analysis methodology in order to determine the
impact of the three explanatory variables on the dependent variable. The data set for this analysis
has been expanded from an original data set created by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness,
published in 2014. Their research considered 126 rival dyads over a ten-year time period in order
to quantitatively examine how many of those rivals are using cyber tactics against one another
and how frequently they do so. Of the 126 rival country dyads that were considered by Valeriano
and Maness only 20 had engaged in cyber disputes or incidents. My dataset include all 20 dyads
that have engaged in cyber interactions (cyber dyads) as well as another 57 non-cyber dyads.

6

This thesis explores but does not commit to a definition as to what a cyber weapon and
cyber attack are, as well as what constitutes cyber warfare. I agree with the original researchers
that these terms are problematic and still not agreed upon by the international community and as
such, I have chosen to retain their vocabulary as much as possible in my thesis.
The thesis will follow a variable-by-variable approach to explaining the findings of the
regression analysis. This will include an examination of how each independent variable, as well
as the other three, relate to one another and their influence on the primary research question. The
analysis will be followed by two case studies. The first focuses on China and the United States
(U.S) and the second on China and Japan. The objective in presenting these case studies is to
delve deeper into the context surrounding inter-state cyber interactions in order to illustrate how
states are using cyber space to advance various foreign policy or security objectives as well as
demonstrate how the use of cyber tactics, in turn, impacts the rivalry dynamics of the dyad.
The thesis will conclude with a summary of the findings from this research along with
suggestions for additional research. This will also include policy recommendations on priority
issues such as resolving dispute over basic terminology and approaches; ensuring that the
multiple processes and fora on cyber issues are compatible and complementary and dealing
effectively with non-state actors, of all types.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of existing literature about how states are engaging
with cyber technology, including how the subject fits within the broader framework of
international relations theory and relates to concepts such as deterrence and restraint. The review
illustrates different perspectives on how to best approach regulating the use of cyber weapons,
including from an international humanitarian law perspective. This chapter further explores
different understandings of rivalry and how the behavior of rival states informs my theories. In
this chapter, disputed terms such as ‘cyber warfare’ or ‘cyber attack’ are utilized in order to
reflect the language of the scholars and experts being cited although elsewhere in the thesis I
utilize different terminology.
A harbinger of war to come?
‘Cyber warfare’ is increasingly in the news headlines and also making its way
into the plots of movies, television series and pop-culture more generally. It is a term not always
well understood or defined, either by academics, diplomats or the media and can refer to a range
of activities, both domestic and international, such as espionage, hacking and surveillance. A full
definition of how this thesis defines cyber war will be provided in the following chapter but it’s
important to begin by noting that each scholar brings a slightly different understanding of what it
means to their work, as do policy experts and government officials. For example, a report
released in October 2014 compiles existing definitions for commonly used cyber security and
information security related terms as used by governments, security bodies and research
institutes.1 There are thirteen recorded entries for “cyber attack” which range from a militarized
perspective as put forward by NATO (“A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or

1

Robert Morgus and Tim Maurer, Compilation of Existing Cybersecurity and Information Security Related
Definitions (New America Foundation, October 2014).
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defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or
destruction to objects.”) to New Zealand’s lighter understanding of the term (“An attempt to
undermine or compromise the function of a computer-based system, access information, or
attempt to track the online movements of individuals without their permission.”).
Possibly as an extension of this, debate exists among scholars and experts on the extent to
which cyber warfare poses a substantial security threat. At one end of the spectrum are those
who take the threat very seriously and see the rise of digital warfare as symptomatic of larger
changes taking place within the international landscape. Against the backdrop of globalization
and rapid growth of the internet and digital technologies in general, it was easy for scholars such
as Arquila and Ronfeldt, writing during the early 1990s, to make the argument that the internet
will fundamentally transform warfare and become the “blitzkrieg” of the 21st century.2 As they
explained, the information revolution is capable of setting in motion forces that challenge the
design of many institutions, including the hierarchies around which institutions are normally
designed.3 It also diffuses and redistributes power in ways that may benefit weaker, smaller
actors and will have an impact on military organization and doctrine more broadly. Arquila and
Ronfeldt believed that while the impact is not yet clear, a change is on the horizon and must be
taken into consideration by policy makers and military officials.
Similarly, Farwell and Rohozinski use the case of the Stuxnet attack on Iranian
centrifuges as a way to demonstrate the growing strategic importance of using cyber weapons. 4
They ask if a cyber attack offers a better risk–benefit trade-off for achieving political or military
goals than a conventional military attack and note that in the case of Stuxnet in particular, it was

2

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyber War Is Coming!,” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993) 31.
Ibid 26.
4
James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” Survival 53, no. 1 (February
2011) 25.
3
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effective in slowing the development of the Iranian nuclear programme.5 Maurer makes a related
point. In one of his articles, he outlines three factors that will determine whether or not cyber
warfare will actually reduce the human costs of war. The conditions include: improvements in
security, how the norms governing use of cyber weapons evolve, and the role of non-state
actors.6 While much remains to be seen, he concludes that a digital Pearl Harbor would cost
fewer lives than the real attack 70 years ago did.7 This is a controversial question, yet one well
worth exploring. If strategic goals can be obtained without any human cost, should cyber
weapons use be encouraged – albeit within certain parameters? This has implications for
regulation and particularly the debate among international humanitarian law (IHL) experts.
Other scholars have been more reluctant to view cyber warfare as anything more than a
trend with few real implications for international relations. Rid, who has provided one of the
most vociferous responses to the so-called ‘alarmist’ camp of literature, states that full blown
cyber war will not take place because the inherently non-violent nature of cyber confrontations
presents a challenge to the normal conduct of war.8 As he explains, there are three main forms of
cyber threats - espionage, sabotage and subversion - none of which are especially violent. As a
result, Rid feels it necessary to realistically assess who is truly vulnerable – countries, industries
or individuals – because the threat may be less acute in some sectors than others, and response
should be developed according to the actual threat. Erik Gartzke has noted that while it is
increasingly common for a state to deploy a hostile cyber attack, such attacks do not take the
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Ibid 29.
Tim Maurer, “The Case for Cyber Warfare,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/19/the_case_for_cyberwar.
7
Ibid.
8
Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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place of terrestrial force and are therefore unlikely to be a final “arbiter of competition in an
anarchical world”.9
Stephen Walt has identified another way to more effectively evaluate the real threat
posed by cyber weapons. He has suggested that research should better distinguish and consider
separately the different and separate dangers that emerge from a cyber attack instead of grouping
them together under the common rubric of cyber warfare.10 Walt identifies four such distinct
dangers, or issues: degrading an enemy’s military capabilities, penetrating networks to shut down
civilian infrastructure, web-based criminal activity, and cyber espionage. As he explains, making
these distinctions could help determine if the fuss over cyber warfare is legitimate or just an
example of threat inflation.11 The interactions that are included in this thesis cover three of those
four types of actions. Web-based criminal activity is excluded. It could be said that the other
three types of dangers, or actions, constitute web-based criminal activity or should become
illegal under international law, but most often the term refers to acts such as infringements of
copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography, hate crimes, and violations of network
security.
This more sober and cautious perspective about the actual threat of cyber conflict is
reinforced by the significant statistical research undertaken by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan
Maness, on which this thesis is based. In their opinion, the field of cyber security needs to return
to social science in order to “definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures and
theory.”12 The results are compelling as they reveal that only 20 of 124 “active rivals” - defined
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Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security
38, no. 2 (October 2013): p.42
10
Stephen Walt, “Is the Cyber Threat Overblown?,” Foreign Policy, March 30, 2010,
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as the most conflict-prone pairs of states in the international system – actually engaged one
another in cyber conflict and that there were only 95 total cyber attacks among these 20 rivals.13
Their research demonstrates statistically that inter-state cyber interactions do not happen as
frequently as many assume and that the severity of operations is consistent and relatively
restrained.
Policy and practice
One of the most comprehensive and up to date sources of information about current state
policy with regard to cyber warfare is The Cyber Index produced by UNIDIR, the Institute for
Peace Research and Security Policy and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. In
addition, many states outline their positions on the subject as part of the national statements they
deliver during the annual deliberations of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee on
Disarmament and International Security. One of the most thorough accounts of the historical
evolution of cyber warfare is A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace 1986 to 2012.14 The
book outlines three distinct phases – realization, take-off and militarization – and provides indepth analysis of 12 case studies of use, well as a glossary and timeline. A further resource that
provides – albeit more cursory – analysis of major cyber attacks is Cybersecurity and Cyberwar:
What everyone needs to know.15 There are numerous credible resources available pertaining to
some of the more high profile cyber attacks that have occurred in recent years including the
American-Israeli Stuxnet attack on Iran in 2010 and Russian-sponsored attacks on Estonia and
Georgia in 2007. The media in many countries has extensively covered the subject of cyber
warfare by documenting attacks as they unfolded or in noting new cooperation and policy
13

B. Valeriano and R. C. Maness, “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists, 2001-11,” Journal
of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (May 1, 2014) 1.
14
Jason Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 - 2012 (U.S.A: The Atlantic Council, 2013).
15
Peter Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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developments between nations on the topic. However, attribution and accuracy always present a
challenge as do the limitations of access to sensitive information.
International law and regulation
One of the largest challenges facing scholars and practitioners in the area of cyber
warfare and weapons is how to understand the way in which it intersects with existing laws and
obligations, including international humanitarian law (IHL). There is substantial writing in this
area and efforts to situate cyber attacks within existing legal frameworks. This most significant
resource in this area is the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare. It was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence by an international group of approximately twenty experts over a three year
period (2009 to 2012). The Manual includes “black letter rules” that are restatements of existing
international law in a cyber context, and as understood and agreed by all the authors. It further
includes the legal basis, normative content and practical implications of each rule.16 For a rule to
have been adopted and included in the Manual, all authors needed to have agreed to it by
consensus. For areas where there were differences of opinion, the Manual includes a
commentary.
One area where there was such a difference of opinion concerns what constitutes an
attack. The Manual defines a cyber attack as a “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive,
that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to
objects”. However, as the commentary shows, experts disagreed as to what exactly was to be

16

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, The Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2013), http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html.
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understood as damage to objects, and whether or what type of impairment of the functioning of
an object would fall within its definition.17
This question has been picked up by Michael Schmitt and Cordula Droege who are
among a small but burgeoning group of scholars and lawyers who seek to situate a cyber ‘attack’
within international humanitarian law (IHL). Droege argues that any attempt to understand if
and how cyber war constitutes legal war in the classic sense of armed conflict must consider the
key IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution as well as the unique
challenges posed by cyber attacks, which tend to deliberately target or will indirectly impact
civilian targets.18 Schmitt therefore observes that the law of cyber armed conflict remains a work
in progress, thus hampering global efforts to establish better regulation or responses to cyber
operations and warfare.19 Laurent Gisel reminds policymakers that assessing the legality of new
weapons – such as cyber weapons - is in the interest of all states, as it will help them ensure that
their armed forces act in accordance with their international obligations.20 He further points out
that Article 36 of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions requires each state
party to make sure that any new weapons it deploys or considers deploying comply with the rules
of IHL. This is also a point underscored by the Tallinn Manual.21
Others feel that new laws more specific to cyber threats need to be developed. These may
or may not be predicated on IHL or humanitarian impact. For many years, states such as Russia
and China, along with a small handful of experts or advocates, have been calling for such a
treaty. It may be surprising that two governments that are so active in cyber space are at the
17

Cordula Droege, “Get off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of
Civilians,” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (June 5, 2013) 557.
18
Ibid 541.
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M. Schmitt, “Classification of Cyber Conflict,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 17, no. 2 (AugU.S.t 8,
2012): 260.
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Laurent Gisel, The law of war imposes limits on cyber attacks too, Webpage, July 1, 2011,
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21
Ibid.
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forefront of this effort and has raised questions from other states about their motives in doing so,
while simultaneously demonstrating that the most powerful nations are often the most vulnerable
to a cyber attack, as noted by Courville. Hughes also feels that existing international law fails to
adequately address cyber threats and argues that it is time for the international community to
begin work on a global cyber treaty.22 He argues that such a treaty could prevent cyberspace
from becoming a default platform for, or alternate theatre of war in which customary
international law does not apply and states can thus act freely. Brown and Friedman disagree
and feel that there are too many practical difficulties involved in establishing a credible
verification regime to accompany a potential cyber treaty.23 Other critics note that beyond
technical difficulties, cultural differences and varied approaches to cyber space would make the
negotiation, adoption and implementation of such an agreement very difficult.24 They further
argue that cyber weapons are too different from biological and chemical weapons for their
respective legal frameworks governing to act as a useful model. These differences include the
dual-use nature of cyber weapons material and the general perception that they are less
destructive.25 Nye Jr. believes that it is more likely that states will work together in order to
address the cyber threats posed by non-state actors, particularly terrorists, rather than seek to
limit their own actions, and that the areas of cyber crime or cyber terrorism are easier ones to
address.26 Given that momentum for global regulation has been stalled for so long this
perspective is not without merit but should not limit the potential for developing regulatory
norms or agreements perhaps on regional or other bases.
22

Rex Hughes, “A Treaty for Cyber Space” (International Affairs, March 2010)
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Theory, power and deterrence
There is not extensive literature situating cyber warfare within international relations
theory. Johan Eriksson and Giacomello Giampier have undertaken to fill this void by analyzing
the impact of the information revolution on security in order to determine what existing
international relations theory can say about this challenge. They believe that realism, with its
emphasis on the primacy of the state, offers the least explanatory power in this instance because
cyber attacks are frequently carried out or at times instigated by non-state actors. It does however
offer a basis for the view that cyber warfare is the continuation of other types of warfare. 27 As
Eriksson and Giampiero note, cyber becomes relevant to realists when viewed as a new
technological component within warfare more broadly. To date, this is largely how cyber
weapons are actually being used. The two case studies included in this thesis will highlight that.
Constructivism offers useful insights for explaining the symbolism and identity-based
aspects of cyber conflict although is limited in its ability to explain the motivation of states to use
cyber weapons.28 One noteworthy constructivist approach to security that they describe is the
theory of "securitization" developed by the Copenhagen school. This is about how, when, and
with what consequences political actors frame something as a matter of security.29 The
Copenhagen school emphasizes the implications of "speech acts", or political language, for
political agenda-setting and political relations. Viewed this way, acts that invade privacy or other
online activities can be legitimized by authorities because the threat, whether valid or not, has
been securitized and framed as a threat, through clever use of language.

27

Johan Eriksson and Giacomello Giampiero, “The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations:
(IR) Relevant Theory?” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 27, no. 3
(July 2006), 228.
28
Ibid 236.
29
Ibid 234.
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Liberalism appears to provide the best framework for explaining many of the basic
features of cyber warfare, such as the multiplicity of transnational non-state actors, the erosion of
national boundaries and the vulnerability of networked economies.30 Despite offering such a
relevant framework, they note that few liberals have engaged with the topic of cyber or the
broader information revolution. Among those who have are Nye Jr. and Keohane. Eriksson and
Giampier explain that their influential theory of complex interdependence initially developed in
the 1970s has been updated in light of the challenges of the digital age. The updated version adds
two new components to their theory – sensitivity and vulnerability – viewed as the costs of
interdependence.31 In the update, Nye Jr. has also elaborated his theory of soft power to argue
that soft power is becoming more important in the digital age than ever before, mainly because
of the evolving multiple channels of global communication that easily transcend sovereign
boundaries. Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and
policies ... Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.32
Nye Jr. has also put forward an explanation of cyber power. He explains that the
characteristics of cyber space are such that they reduce some of the power differentials among
actors, and therefore have the potential to create power shifts among states.33 This occurs when
limited opportunities open up for small states to leapfrog over larger ones, which would increase
the diffusion of power to non-state actors although there will always be some states that continue
to be more powerful than others. Evidence demonstrates that the most consistent users of cyber
weapons are large and already powerful or developed states and that as of yet, developing

30
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nations are not taking advantage of this opportunity. This thesis argues the same although the
case studies illustrate that among the cyber capable, this approach is being employed such as by
China. Sheldon examines the different roles that developed and developing states play in policy
discussions, nothing that much of the debate about cyber in the diplomatic and international
security agenda have revolved around the concerns of developed countries, while developing
countries have either been silent, ignored or as he says, cast as “cyber villains”. He argues that
while there is a gap in developing world participation in the global dialogue and debate on
cyberspace issues, there are several important areas of interdependent and common interest in
cyberspace of equal importance to both developed and developing states.34 This includes a
growing level of vulnerability of developing nations to a cyber attack and also their role as cyber
technology manufacturers.
Stemming from this is debate as to what lessons can be applied to cyber from experience
in controlling the use and spread of nuclear weapons. Libicki has pointed out that there are
critical differences between cyber weapons and nuclear weapons that must be considered. These
include the challenges of attribution; the limited possibilities for a second strike, retaliation or
sustained attack; and the potential for escalation.35 Nye agrees with Libicki that these differences
are real ones, but believes that there are insights learned from nuclear deterrence that could apply
to cyber deterrence. He notes that even when the source of a cyber attack can be successfully
disguised under a so-called false flag, and it’s not clear who the aggressor is, governments may
still find themselves sufficiently entangled in symmetrically interdependent relationships that a
major attack would be counterproductive.36 He gives the example of China and the United States,

34

John B. Sheldon, “Achieving Mutual Comprehension,” Disarmament Forum Four (2011): 41.
Martin C Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009),
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=304894.
36
Nye 11.
35

18

who are very often engaged in cyber disputes with one another but who are also increasingly
interconnected, particularly economically. China would itself lose from a cyber attack that
severely damaged the U.S. economy, and vice versa.37 A reputation for offensive capability and a
declared policy that keeps open the potential means of retaliation can help to reinforce
deterrence.38 This thesis will explore this argument specifically with respect to China and the
U.S., in Chapter Six.
Defining rivalry
Deterrence theory may be able to explain why rivals that frequently engage in cyber
disputes with one another rarely or never escalate the level of attacks they are conducting. Rivals
were selected by Valeriano and Maness because they are the most conflict prone actors in the
international system upon whom much has been written and observed.39 Moreover, arms races
and policies of deterrence do not exist between states that do not regard each other as
adversaries. Rivalries are thus an excellent basis for exploring how and why cyber technology is
being used in a hostile way.
There is a good body of literature about rivalry and related concepts such as protracted
conflict, which has generated a few commonly accepted and used definitions for what rivalry
constitutes. Hensel draws on the work of other scholars to describe rivals as “two or more actors
whose relations are characterized by disagreement or competition over some stakes that are
viewed as important, where each perceives that the other poses a significant security threat, and
where this competition and threat perception last for substantial periods of time".40 Hensel
further explains that enduring rivals are those characterized as being involved in repeated
37

Ibid
Ibid 12.
39
Valeriano and Maness 3.
40
Paul R. Hensel, “Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict,” New Directions in the Study of
International Conflict, Crises, and War, 1998, 162–204.
38

19

confrontations or crises, which helps to highlight the rivals' disagreement over important stakes
and which contributes to each rival's perception of a security threat from the other.41 He gives
examples of France and Germany through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan since 1947, and Israel and Syria
since 1948.
Hensel’s definition is similar to other scholars who do not define a rivalry based on the
number and frequency of militarized disputes. Vasquez argues that an adequate concept of
rivalry must be able to predict when two states will have recurring disputes and not make the
number of disputes a defining condition.42 He defines rivalry as “a relationship characterized by
extreme competition and psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are
governed primarily by their attitude toward each other rather than by the stakes at hand.”43
Bennett uses an “issues approach” to understand when rivalries end. For Bennett, rivalries end
when the governments involved explicitly settle the issue that has driven the rivalry.44 He further
describes rivalries as “long-term hostile relationships” in which one or both states occasionally
use military force or the threat of it in an attempt to shift the resolution of the issues at stake in
their favour.45 Thompson stresses the role of perception. His definition states that rivalry must be
based on a state’s perception of which its principal enemy is, which means that he believes that
principal rivals can exist without militarized disputes ever occurring.46 His work has some
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similarity to that of Vasquez because both want to conceptualize rivalries in a way to be able to
identify them before a crisis or conflict.47
At the other end of the spectrum are those who put the number and frequency of
militarized disputes or conflicts at the centre of their definition of a rivalry. Wayman and Jones
identify enduring rivals as those who have had at least five reciprocated militarized disputes
within 25 years. This builds on what Wayman described as a pattern of “enduring disputation” in
an earlier study that sought to explain the effect of dispute escalation into war. Goertz and Diehl
offer a slightly different definition of enduring rivalries while utilizing the same criteria. For
them, these are dyads that engage in six or more disputes over a 20-year span. Based on this
definition they have identified two additional types of rivalry—isolated conflict and protorivalry.48 Isolated conflict refers to a dyad that experiences one or two disputes, whereas a protorivalry refers to those that have more than two disputes but do not fulfill the criteria for an
enduring rivalry. These other forms of conflictual relationships may not be as severe or as
protracted as full enduring rivalries, but they highlight the continuous nature of rivalry. Their
sharply defined concept of rivalry has enabled Goertz and Diehl to develop a rivalry data set that
is widely used by researchers and scholars, including this thesis.
Hewitt articulates a “crisis density formula” for identifying rivalries. His definition of
crisis is taken from the International Crisis Behaviour project, which applies three criteria to
determine what a crisis is – leaders must perceive a heightened probability of military hostilities,
a grave threat to national values and face either a shortened or finite time in which to make
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decisions.49 A crisis-based rivalry is defined in terms of the frequency of crises between two
states over a specified time period rather than full-fledged militarized interstate disputes (MID)
which he feels has greater value because a rivalry relationship of mistrust can already exist in
prior to a MID taking place.50 This approach results in a different understanding about when
rivalries are initiated. It is a slightly broader way to envisage a rivalry than those approaches that
only include militarized disputes.
It’s necessary to underpin any conceptualization of rivalry or protracted conflict with real
data and for scholars in this field to be able to identify from where they base their inferences.
There are four available datasets of rival dyads. Thompson’s dataset from 2000 was developed
by looking at a historical record to determine which states see each other as their principal rival
during a given period. The others were produced by Wayman and Jones in 1991 and Klein,
Goertz and Diehl in 1992. The latter is the most commonly used and was updated in 2006 to
reflect new information made available through the Correlates of War (COW) Project Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID) Data Set. 51 It is, as indicated earlier, the dataset from which this thesis
has pulled its list of rival pairs.
Rivalry behavior
Rivalry between two states is dynamic and constantly changing. Knowing more about
the behavior of rivals, particularly with respect to how they engage in restraint, deterrence
activities and at what point a conflict or crisis will escalate is instructive to inferring how cyber
weapons are used in the context of a rivalry. Here, Diehl’s work in looking at arms races and
conflict escalation is useful. Operating off of the understanding that an arms race does not
49
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necessarily constitute a rivalry, he further finds that arms races alone do not substantially
increase the escalation of militarized disputes to war between major power enduring rivals.52
Further analysis reveals though that arms races do increase the risk of escalation to war but only
when – among other factors - the adversaries have a history of recent militarized conflict.53
Applied to cyber disputes, this means that a cyber arms race will not necessarily lead to a fullblown cyber war unless the rivals have recently engaged in conflict. As they have never engaged
in a direct military dispute, it would follow that their current cyber arms race will not lead to a
full-blown cyber war.
Azar, although writing over 40 years ago, described inter-state interactions as having a
range which the states involved perceive as normal. This normal relations range (NRR) is bound
by two critical thresholds - an upper and a lower threshold.54 The upper critical threshold is that
level of hostility above which any signals exhibited by either member of the interacting dyad are
regarded as unacceptable to the other, and can imply that a crisis situation has set in. The lower
critical threshold on the other hand is that level of friendliness beyond which signals between the
members imply that some integrative shift in their relations-the inverse of a crisis-has occurred.55
Valeriano and Maness, in the research upon which this thesis takes its data, also discuss
deterrence and restraint. They believe that restraint plays a “critical role” in the cyber realm.56
They speculate that rivals will tolerate cyber combat operations if they do not cross a line, such
as the destruction of the energy infrastructure of a state or infiltrations meant to take control of
army units or facilities. This is because doing so would, in the context of a rivalry, lead directly
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to war or retaliation.57 For the most part, rivals are operating within an NRR. Valeriano and
Maness also point to the limits imposed by the need to avoid civilian harm as a factor
contributing to restraint. While an initial attack may not have directly target civilians, the fall-out
of the attack or retaliation could. This might manifest as critical infrastructure that is damaged
and unable to operate, or havoc to global financial systems.58
Having reviewed the relevant literature on cyber warfare and rivalry, this thesis will next
described the methodology by which it will test my theories.
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Chapter Three – Methodology

As set out in the Introduction, the primary research question that this thesis will answer is:
what are the rivalry dynamics that cause a cyber interaction between two states? In the course of
doing so this thesis will examine the following additional research questions: does the intensity
of a rivalry between two states impact the likelihood of cyber ‘weapons’ being used? Do states
only use cyber weapons against rivals who are economically weaker? Do states only use cyber
weapons against rivals who are militarily weaker? Does the level of interconnectedness between
two rival states impact the likelihood of cyber weapons being used?
I argue that states are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival
when:
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high;
Hypothesis 2: When there is economic and/or military asymmetry within the dyad;
Hypothesis 3: When the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral
agreements.

The overall methodology of this thesis will be to conduct a regression analysis of data sets
compiled by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness as part of their research on “The dynamics of
cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001–11” against new independent variables. Their
research looked at 126 rival dyads in order to quantitatively examine how many of those dyads
are actually using cyber technology in a hostile way against one another and how frequently they
do so. They also tested theories of restraint and regionalism and discovered that the actual
magnitude and pace of cyber interactions among rivals is not as great or frequent as might be
imagined.
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Unit of analysis, case selection and time frame
The unit of analysis for this thesis is a rival state dyad. Of the 126 rival dyads that were
considered by Valeriano and Maness only 20 had engaged in a cyber dispute or incident. There
are 14 countries within the 20 rival dyads who have initiated an incident. They are China,
Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South
Korea, Syria and the United States. There are another six countries that were victims but did not
retaliate – Bangladesh, Estonia, Iraq, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The universe of cases
for this thesis includes all of those 20 dyads that have experienced a cyber interaction (which I
refer to as cyber dyads) as well as 57 other rival dyads that did not (referred to as non-cyber
dyads). Among 30 of the non-cyber dyads, one of the two states is also a part of a cyber dyad.
For example, Russia and Estonia are one dyad where there has been a cyber event. Russia and
Canada are another dyad that did not experience a cyber event. This offers a potentially
interesting basis for comparison – why was there use of cyber weapons in one dyad, but not in
another?
What is meant by a rival? As outlined in Chapter Two, there are different ways of
defining this term. Some maintain that military conflict, and a certain number of conflicts over a
given amount of time is a necessary factor while others emphasize the role of perceptions. Since
Valeriano and Maness based their dataset on the 2006 rivalry dataset compiled by Klein, Goertz
and Diehl, their research and subsequently this thesis is limited to defining rivals in the same
way that Klein, Goertz and Diehl do. As they explain, they regard rivalries as “possessing and
varying across four constituent dimensions: (1) spatial consistency, (2) duration, (3) militarized
competitiveness, and (4) linked conflict.”59 They exclude dyads that have experienced isolated
conflict, and note that a rivalry relationship is one in which the military component of foreign
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policy is an important element: much of their foreign policy is conceived of and conducted in
military terms.60
As already outlined in Chapter Two, there are some weaknesses with their definition. It
does not allow for the role that perception can play in inter-state dynamics and places perhaps
too much emphasis on the military dimension. Most of the rivalries included here also have an
economic dimension, which I account for in some of the variables used to evaluate rivalry
intensity and interconnectedness. Yet the Klein, Goertz and Diehl data set is highly credible and
widely used, providing a solid basis for this evaluation.
The time frame for the cases is 2001 – 2011, as set out by the original researchers. They
chose 2011 as the end point to allow for a lag time that would provide for extensive analysis of
all cyber events. In order to build out the data set, Valeriano and Maness employed the
following methodology to find the relevant news stories and analysis of cyber incidents and
disputes between rivals. Using a Google News search query they entered ‘rival A’ (e.g. Iran)
AND ‘rival B’ (e.g. Israel) AND ‘cyber’ OR ‘internet attack’ OR ‘infrastructure attack’ OR
‘government attack.’ They were seeking the date and duration of the incident, who initiated the
incident, the foreign policy objective of the initiator (disruption, theft, change the target state’s
behavior), whether or not a third party was involved in the incident, whether or not there was an
official government statement by the initiator about the incident (denial or acceptance), and the
method and severity of the incident. They note that in most cases sources were corroborated by
multiple newspaper articles, blogs, and reports (coming from both think tanks and internet
security firms), controlling for source validity and to avoid letting one perspective dictate a data
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point. Each news story, report, or post utilized was carefully examined to ensure that the proper
coding has taken place.61
As Valeriano and Maness admit, attribution can be a problematic issue and it’s easy to
level the charge that their dataset may contain inaccuracies. 62 When attribution was in serious
doubt, they did not include the incident or dispute in their dataset. They have also not included
incidents or disputes involving anonymous hackers or operatives, seeking instead instances that
are clear and explicit. They have considered the context of any alleged incident including the
history of relations between the two states involved, noting that many incidents and disputes
listed were corroborated with multiple news articles, blogs or reports. This thesis does not have
the capacity to review the incidents and disputes they have listed to ensure their accuracy in the
event of any new information being released subsequent to the conclusion of their research and
will work from the information contained there.
It should be acknowledged that by using the rival dyads as the unit of analysis, this thesis
has two weaknesses. First, it overlooks the specific circumstances of each cyber incident or
dispute, notably the details of which state was the initiator of the cyber interaction. Within some
dyads like the U.S. and China there are both aggressors and victims. Within others, like Russia
and Georgia, one state deployed the operation. Therefore the information collected about the
dyads is unable to account for which state was in a position of economic or military superiority
at the time of an attack, or if rivalry was especially intense at that moment. The decision to take
this approach was done in order to allow for non-use dyads to also be included in the study. This
is important but comes at the cost of understanding the context of each instance of use. To
remedy this, the thesis includes two case studies that delve deeper into specific incidents and
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political context. As well, most of the variables – like trade flow, bilateral treaties, wealth and
military expenditure – are relevant over the entire time frame under consideration and are
unlikely to be substantially different at one point during the time frame. In addition, this
approach potentially overlooks some states or other types of state-to-state relationships,
including pairings that might be considered as rivals by other scholars. The logic and merits of
using rivalry as a selection device have already been explained – these are the most conflict
prone actors in the international system and there is sufficient literature and studies available to
guide predictions as to their behavior. In order to move forward with the development of a data
set however, it was necessary to establish some basis for case selection. This thesis has chosen to
not expand the cases to non-rivals for reasons of capacity but recognizes the value of doing so in
future research.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this thesis is a cyber interaction between two rival countries. A
cyber interaction is either an incident or a dispute, two terms that Valeriano and Maness chose to
use in lieu of ‘cyber attack.’ They deliberately chose to not use the term ‘cyber war’ either as
they agree with Rid that cyber war is not about actual war where deaths result.63 Similarly, they
also moved away from use of the term attack as they believe it is misguiding and inappropriate in
that it sounds too similar to a conventional military attack.64 Instead, incidents and disputes have
been adopted as their basic terminology and will also be utilized in this thesis, although at times I
will say interaction or operation when referring to both types. They have defined cyber incidents
as individual operations launched against a state. It may include multiple attacks or uses of a
single weapon, but all as part of the same operation and conducted by the same perpetrator. They
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used the example of Shady RAT, which was a five year operation that involved thousands of
intrusions and affected over 70 parties including government departments of multiple countries,
defense contractors and other private businesses. It would have been impossible for them to log
each and every intrusion or act that was a component part of the broader operation so instead
they logged the incident as a whole.65 Cyber disputes are specific campaigns between two states
using cyber tactics during a particular time period and can contain one to several incidents, often
including an initial engagement and responses. For example, incidents such as GhostNet, Shady
Rat, the Pentagon Raid, and the F-35 jet plan theft initiated by China against the United States
and the US responses of Buckshot Yankee and Cisco Raider are all part of a single sustained
cyber dispute between the two rivals in which China sought access to U.S. military
information.66 The initiator of the dispute or incident is always from a government or
government affiliate, although targets may be non-state if they are important to a state’s national
security such as companies like Lockheed Martin or Mitsubishi. As already mentioned, the time
frame in which these incidents take place is 2001 – 2011.
Table 2.1 outlines the different activities and tools that comprise a cyber event. These are
taken from Valeriano and Maness as based on definitions provided by other researchers such as
Clarke, Knake and Reveron. These activities, as well as the software and tools that facilitate
them, are what might be considered to constitute a cyber weapon although I must stress that there
is no universal definition for that term either.
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Table 3.1 Commonly used cyber tactics and tools
Name
Website defacements or
vandalism

Description
Structured query language (SQL) or cross-site scripting is used to deface
or destroy the target’s web page. Generally these types of attacks have a
propaganda element and are a form of control, suggesting to the target
they lack the capability to control their cyberspace operations.

Distributed denial of service
(DDoS) methods

Target websites, servers or routers are flooded with more requests for
data than they can respond to or process and shut down as a result, which
prevents access or usage. Such attacks are coordinated through ‘botnets’
or ‘zombies’ which are a network of computers that have been forced to
operate on the commands of remote users.

Intrusions

More targeted and severe than defacements or vandalism. They cause
longer-term damage. Occurs when unauthorized software added to a
program to allow entry or future access to a site once it has been initially
attacked. They are difficult to detect and can remain dormant for a long
time, and then propagate themselves without notice. The purpose of
intrusions is usually to steal sensitive information from secured sites,
which can have a destructive effect on a state’s national interests.
Includes Trojans, trapdoors and backdoors.

Infiltrations

These penetrate targeted networks through a wider range of methods
such as logic bombs, viruses, worms, packet sniffers, and keystroke. All
of these five methods are highly precise attacks that seek out specific
data or computers or networks to undertake tasks that they would
normally not undertake.

Advanced persistent threats
(APTs)

Include any of the four methods listed above but are highly sophisticated,
customized and move very slowly so as to avoid detection. Examples
include the Stuxnet worm or the Flame virus.

Source: Valeriano and Maness, 2014.

Independent variables
This thesis considers three primary independent variables (IVs): rivalry intensity, military
and economic asymmetry, and interconnectedness. Other variables include the possession of
nuclear weapons by any of the two states in the dyad, the geographic region and the civilization
type.
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IV1: Rivalry intensity
The first independent variable, intensity of rivalry within the dyad, has been included in
order to determine if cyber events are more common among rivals with higher or lower levels of
antagonism. My theory is that there exists a higher level of intensity among the cyber use dyads
than among the non-use dyads because as intensity increases, so too does the level of
antagonistic behavior and potential reasons to engage in a cyber incident or dispute.
Intensity is calculated by looking at four distinct underlying variables, each of which
relates to at least one of the elements that Klein, Goertz and Diehl utilize for determining the
existence of a rivalry. Again, their four elements are spatial consistency, duration, militarized
conflict, and linked conflict. The four underlying variables that I’ve selected are described
below.
a) Existence of a territorial dispute in the post-1945 period
A territorial dispute is an evidence of linked conflict; meaning that it represents conflict over an
issue of mutual concern and importance. I have defined it to mean a circumstance where both
states in the dyad lay claim to the same geographic area, whether land or sea. This may result in
armed conflict or it may not escalate beyond angry political statements and claims. Some may
involve additional states as claimants. The time frame has been chosen because of the significant
border changes that have taken place since the end of the Second World War Most of the
disputes identified have roots in border or land changes that go back several decades, which
made it difficult to limit the time frame to match the time frame used for cyber cases and still
account for the current impact of a lengthy and unresolved dispute. Data was sourced from the
CIA Field Listings of Disputes.67 When more detail was needed I utilized a simple Google
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search. If there were one or more such disputes within the dyad it was coded as one. If there were
none, then it was coded as zero, meaning that the existence of a territorial dispute increases the
overall intensity of the rivalry.
b) Existence of a trade dispute
Similar to territorial disputes, trade disputes represent linked conflict. It is also a way to ensure
that rivalry intensity is based on factors beyond military ones. I used the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as a source of information about the existence of a trade dispute between
two countries.68 I have included both direct disputes, in which one state is a claimant and the
other a defendant, as well as indirect and third party disputes, provided that the two states are on
opposite sides of the disagreement. I have also included cases which are still open as well as
those which have been resolved. Coding is as follows: one if there was a trade dispute; zero if
there was not. Again, this means that the existence of a trade dispute(s) increases rivalry
intensity.
c) Historic duration of the rivalry
The history of a rivalry is an important factor in determining its intensity because it helps to
distinguish between an isolated conflict and a dispute over a single issue versus a historic and ongoing antagonism between two countries. It is also one of the four elements used by Klein,
Goertz and Diehl. I utilized the rivalry start and end dates included in their 2006 data set and
calculated the duration of the rivalry in days. These were measured on a zero - one scale in
which zero represents the shortest rivalries and one represents the longest, which means that for
the purposes of this thesis, a longer rivalry is also a more intense one.
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d) Number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by the dyad.
MIDs were selected to substantiate the fourth of Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s elements - the
existence of militarized conflict. They are defined as conflicts between states that do not escalate
to full-scale war, which there are fewer than 1000 deaths, and some military force is used. The
data for this was taken from Version 4 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data collection
compiled by the Correlates of War Project (COW).69 A higher number of MIDs within a dyad is
interpreted as contributing to the intensity of the overall rivalry.
All four of the underlying variables were treated with equal weighting, and an average
was taken across them to determine the overall intensity of each rivalry through four methods, in
which the inclusion of the territorial dispute sub-variable was altered for three time frames: pre
2001, 2001 – 2011, and since 1945. The fourth method did not include territorial dispute as an
underlying variable.
IV2: Military and economic asymmetry
As noted earlier in this thesis, it is often said that what makes cyber operations attractive
to states of all shapes and sizes are the relatively low costs and barriers to entry. The logic
follows that it should be possible for states to attack larger or more powerful opponents using
cyber technology. Yet what are the actual power differentials between states? I predict greater
disparity between the cyber dyads than the non-cyber dyads represented by a high degree of
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad.
In order to evaluate this, the thesis will take the average of the gross domestic product
(GDP) and the military expenditure for each state, in each dyad. Data for GDP is sourced from
the International Monetary Fund’s Economic Outlook Database (September 2011) in current
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U.S. dollars.70 Data for military expenditure is sourced from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database in U.S. dollars at 2011 rates.71 It is not a
reflection of what percentage of GDP is spent on defence and military, but is the actual spending.
I then calculated the percentage difference in GDP and in military expenditure between the two
states within the dyad, so as to determine the extent of asymmetry for each variable. The time
frame for each measure is 2001 – 2011 so as to correspond with the overall timeframe that
Valeriano and Maness considered.
IV3: Interconnectedness
The third independent variable is the level of interconnectedness between the two states
in the dyad. I hypothesize that, higher levels of interconnectedness increase the likelihood of
hostile cyber activity. This is because in spite of their economic or other closeness, these states
are still rivals, seeking to find an advantage over the other. Yet conventional warfare or attacks,
present challenges to pursuing those advantages and so a cyber operation, which is easier to hide
and less physically damaging or morally unacceptable, presents a viable option.
I have chosen to measure interconnectedness by looking at the trade relationships within
the dyad and the number of bilateral treaty agreements between the two countries. Here I used
data from the COW Trade Data Set, Version 3.0, created by Katherine Barbieri and Omar M.G.
Keshk, specifically their dyadic trade data set.72 As with the rivalry and MID data sets, the trade
information was arranged by COW country codes. I used these to search for each rival dyad and
locate the amount, in US dollars, that each country within the dyad imports from the other each
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year from 2001 – 2009, which is the last year included in the data set. These were averaged
across the time frame and then a percentage difference was taken. It was important that the time
frame corresponded as much as possible with 2001 – 2011 in order to explore the dynamics of
trade relationships at a time when cyber events are also taking place. Trade interdependence was
then determined by taking the sum of Country A’s trade dependence on Country B, and Country
B’s trade dependence on Country A. It was also calculated in a second way - taking the sum of
Country A’s trade dependence on Country B, and Country B’s trade dependence on Country A
and scaling it to a minimum value of zero, and a maximum of one.
I used the World Treaty Index to research the number of bilateral treaties that exist
within the dyad, by entering the name of each state and selecting ‘bilateral’ in the Laterality
field.73 The Index provides access to over 55,000 treaties of the 20th century, from sources
ranging from the United Nations Treaty Series to various national indexes, gazettes, and official
files. I have only counted treaties from 1945 onward. I did not choose to limit the timeframe to
2001 – 2009 for this variable because of the possibility that bilaterals concluded earlier are still
relevant to current dynamics within the dyad.
Other variables
There are three other variables included in the analysis which represent interesting facets
of rivalry but are not expected to have significant explanatory power.
The first of these pertains to regional dynamics. One of the learning points from
Valeriano and Maness’ research was the realization that the majority of interstate cyber
interactions takes place on a regional basis. Moreover, many of the policy instruments being
developed by states in the area of cyber security are regional ones such as in Europe, Asia and
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now Africa. While regionalism might not explain or cause use, the trend toward regionalism
makes it a variable worth noting. I’ve defined regions as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa; East Asia
and the Pacific; Europe and Eurasia; Middle East and North Africa; South and Central Asia; the
Western Hemisphere and Other. If the two states within the dyad are in different global regions I
coded a one; if they are the same then they were coded zero.
Second, and somewhat related to the above, is if the two states within the dyad are of the
same civilization type. Civilization type relates to Huntington’s theory that the primary source of
conflict in the post-Cold War world will be ethnic and religious identity.74 It is included here so
as to see if there are trends among users and non-users with respect to their civilization type. For
example, are those dyads that have experienced a cyber event typically comprised of states from
the same civilization type or not? I have used the following categories of civilizations, taken
from an article by Henderson and Tucker and which are based on Huntington’s categories:
African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, Western and
Other.75 If the two states in the dyad are from the same civilization they received a score of zero,
if they are from different ones than a code of one was assigned.
Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons is pertinent as a variable because of the
comparisons starting to be made between the cyber and nuclear sphere, particularly with respect
to theories of deterrence and use, as explained in Chapter Two. It’s unlikely that simply having a
nuclear arsenal will cause one state to launch a cyber attack on a rival, but since nuclear weapon
states do have power and clout in international relations it could be speculated that they are more
willing to engage in cyber activity as they fear retaliation less. I’ve used a Fact Sheet from the
Arms Control Association, a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank, to verify nuclear versus non74
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nuclear states.76 They include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
as well as India, Pakistan and Israel. The latter three are not members of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and Israel has never gone on record as admitting to possessing weapons but
is believed to have them, by most of the international community. I’ve also chosen to designate
North Korea as a nuclear weapon state for the purposes of this thesis. Coding for this variable is
as follows: zero if neither state has nuclear weapons; one if one state within the dyad has nuclear
weapons; two if both possess nuclear weapons.
The diagram below provides a visual outline to understanding the variables just
described.
Diagram 3.1 Variables and hypotheses

What causes a
cyber
interaction
between two
rival states?
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Alternative theories or explanations
The study of antagonistic cyber activity between states is a relatively new area of
research and naturally there are other explanations that could be explored beyond what is
included in this thesis. For example, one could argue that states initiate cyber operations because
there are no real repercussions for doing so. International law on this point is undefined,
although rapidly becoming clearer in the area of cybercrime such as through the European
Council’s Convention on Cybercrime. Yet this is difficult to evaluate because in this theory,
states are basing their actions on anticipated responses that could be rooted in past behaviour or
current legal reality, but such an approach is a predictive and hypothetical one. It might require a
more general study of how states behave with respect to other issues of concern where there is no
clear law or regulation to guide behaviour. Another factor that is worth exploring through
additional research, and that builds on theories of deterrence and rationalism, would be what role
alliances play in the decision to use a cyber technology against another state. The United States
considered attacking Syria through cyber technologies in early 2013, for example, but did not do
so. Were they concerned that Russia would counter attack in defense of Syria?77 Again, this
might be difficult to prove because unless there are clear alliances with agreements that extend to
cyber space, it’s largely speculative as to whether or not an ally would take retaliatory action.
As mentioned in the Chapter Two, a lot has been written about the relatively low costs
and barriers of entry as factors contributing to the growth of cyber warfare. It is true that much
can be accomplished in cyber space by just a few individuals or a modest budget. For example,
the incident against Estonia in 2007 was conducted using downloadable software and by
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individuals that, mostly, lacked expertise in computer programming.78 The users of cyber
weapons included in this thesis represent a broad range of wealth levels, as measured by GDP,
yet by and large developing countries have yet to cultivate offensive cyber capabilities. There is
a noticeable lack of African countries, for example, from among those known to have used cyber
weapons although the African Union has recently adopted a Cyber Security Convention.79
Finally, it might be argued that an international relations framework or a focus on states
is not the best method for understanding the threats posed by cyber weapons. A state-centric
approach such as the one employed here could be deemed insufficient to understand and explain
the complicated network of actors involved in any incident or attack; moreover the challenges of
attribution could reduce the validity of the incidents and disputes presented here. It has been the
case that an attack was attributed to a certain government, or undertaken by a network assumed
to be affiliated to a government, only to have it later revealed that this was not the case. As noted
earlier, Valeriano and Maness utilized a clear methodology in their process to develop the dataset
and attribute attacks as accurately as possible with the understanding that any effort to build such
a database is limited by the amount of information publicly available. My research has elected to
use an international relations framework and approach because states continue to be the primary
actors and decision makers in the international system, even as their role is changing. It is
certainly true that cyber weapons impact and engage non-state actors to a high degree, but states
continue to be the main players.
Having now outlined the methodology by which my hypotheses will be tested, the
following chapter will present results.
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Chapter Four – Results
A multi-variable regression analysis was performed on the new dataset that tested 77
cases of interstate rival dyads against eleven distinct variables which were intended to prove
three hypotheses. The cases included 20 dyads that had experienced a cyber incident or dispute –
also referred to as a cyber interaction or operation - and 57 that had not. The rivals are all drawn
from the Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006 rivalry data set. Data was not always available for every
dyad – notably the gross domestic product (GDP) and military expenditure of North Korea and
Cuba, and trade data for Vietnam.
Overview of results
The results show that the three hypotheses fail to predict what causes a cyber interaction
between rival states. Based on the samples used and data collected, there is no statistical
correlation between a cyber interaction and either the intensity of the rivalry; the military and
economic asymmetry between the rivals; or their interconnectedness. This was true in each of the
three models tested. The first model excluded economic asymmetry (GDP), the second excluded
military asymmetry (military expenditure) and third included both so as to account for
collinearity.
Figure 4.1 outlines the odds ratios for each variable across three different models. Odds
ratios are the factors by which each variables increases the odds, or likelihood of a cyber
interaction. The greater the number, the greater the probability of an interaction taking place.
Asterisks are used to indicate odds ratios that are significant. The table also includes standard
error (represented as S.e.), meaning the estimated standard deviation of error in the process
employed. Rivalry intensity varied from an odds ratio of 4.52 to 6.28, depending on the model.
This is a positive relationship but not statistically significant enough for it to be explanatory. The

41

odds ratio for economic asymmetry was nearly exactly the same in both of the models in which it
was included (1.00 and 1.01 respectively), as was also true for military asymmetry (1.00 and
0.99). Trade interdependence varied from 1.54 to 1.56.
Apart from the main explanatory variables, the thesis looked at three others – regional
difference, civilization difference and the possession of nuclear weapons by one or both states in
the dyad. It was found that there is no correlation between a cyber interaction and if the rivals
are from the same region or of the same civilization. There is however an extremely strong
relationship between a cyber activity and if one or both states in the dyad possess nuclear
weapons. In fact, the odds of a cyber event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear
power are about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80
times greater. This result has implications for the debate referenced in Chapter Two, regarding
the applicability of nuclear deterrence theory to cyber space as well as other lessons learned from
the nuclear sphere. These implications will be discussed in the following chapter after a closer
look at trends and other observations from the other variables.
These results are significant nonetheless because they allow us to begin to rule out certain
assumptions and ideas and sharpen understanding around how, when and in what context cyber
technology is being used, or is not being used. We have learned that these factors, expressed as
variables, are not sufficient to account for use and know that we must look elsewhere for
answers. In the process of testing the theories however, certain trends and patterns emerged that
might be useful clues for that additional research. These are discussed in the remainder of this
chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Predictors of cyber events among rival dyads
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Hypothesis 1: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival
when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high.
I theorized that there would be a higher level of rivalry intensity among the cyber dyads than
among the non-cyber dyads based on the assumption that as intensity increases, so too does the
level of antagonistic behavior and potential reasons to engage in a cyber incident or dispute.
As explained in Chapter Three, intensity was calculated by looking at four distinct underlying
variables, each of which relates to at least one of the elements that Klein, Goertz and Diehl
utilize for determining the existence of a rivalry. These four underlying variables are: the
existence of a territorial dispute; the existence of a trade dispute; the duration of the conflict and
the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by the dyad. Each was scored
on a zero - one scale and the average taken across all four in order to arrive at an overall intensity
rating.
The analysis showed, overall, a positive relationship between rivalry intensity and cyber
activity yet did not return a high enough probability level (approximately 5 percent) to establish
a causal relationship. This suggests that this could be an avenue worth further study although
perhaps through a different approach. For example, this could be to test rivalry on a ‘case by
case’ basis and link it to intensity at the time of a cyber event, rather than trying to ascertain the
level of rivalry over a ten year time period. Undoubtedly rivalry levels fluctuated in that time and
the method used by this thesis did not allow for pinpointing exact moments of heightened rivalry
and if those moments corresponded to a cyber event. The case studies that in Chapter Six will
assist with providing some of this context. Each of the underlying variables could also be further
refined to allow for more rigor in applying them – for example, I included and treated as equal
any territorial dispute that had taken place since 1945 but it could be argued that some are more
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contested, violent or intense than others and that a weighting system may have yielded different
results.
A closer look at each variable is instructive and demonstrates that there is not a high
degree of difference, across each variable, between the cyber and non-cyber dyads. For example,
50 percent of the cyber dyads and 52 percent of the non-cyber dyads had reported a territorial
dispute, an almost even divide. There was a slightly larger difference with respect to trade
disputes where 20 percent of the cyber group had lodged a trade complaint against the other state
in the in the dyad and only 11 percent of the non-cyber had.
The third underlying variable measured the duration of each dyad’s rivalry using the
logic that a longer duration equals a higher intensity. As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the majority of
cyber dyads have rivalries that are in the 50 – 74 year range whereas many of the non-cyber
dyads have rivalries that are in the 2 – 24 year time range. It appears that there is a tendency for
the cyber dyads to have longer standing rivalries. Significantly though, there are two non-cyber
dyads whose rivalries have extended beyond 100 years. One of these is Russia-Japan, two
countries that have each experienced cyber events separately, with other rivals, but not with one
another. None of the cyber dyads fall have a recorded riavlry of this duration.
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Table 4.2 Duration of rivalry
Duration of
rivalry

# Cyber dyads
(Total: 17)

Percentage

#Non-cyber
dyads (Total: 77)

Percentage

Less than one
year

0

0%

0

0%

2 – 24 years

4

23.5%

55

71%

25 – 49 years

5

29.5 %

15

19%

50 - 74 years

8

47 %

4

5%

75 – 99 years

0

0%

0

0%

100+ years

0

0%

2

11 %
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The number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) experienced by rivals varied from zero to a
maximum of 50 (Russia – U.S.). The results here are not dissimilar to duration. The clear
majority of non-cyber dyads (61 percent) had not experienced a MID but a few (6 percent) had
experienced a comparatively high number of MIDs, over 50. In contrast, there were more dyads
on the whole that had experienced a MID among the cyber group but only one dyad of that group
has experienced more than 50 MIDs. Therefore while the cyber dyads tended to have
experienced more militarized interstate disputes on the whole, fewer of them had experienced an
especially high number of them.

Hypothesis 2: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival
when there is economic and military asymmetry within the dyad.
My second hypothesis responded to statements about the asymmetrical nature of cyber
warfare and its potential for power shifts despite the observation that the most active states in the
cyber space continue to be economically developed and powerful countries. The analysis
demonstrates that there is only around a one percent probability that asymmetry causes a cyber
event to take place within a rival dyad however; meaning that asymmetry, on its own is not a
sufficient explanation. There was not a larger disparity in either the GDP or military spending of
the cyber dyads than among the non-cyber dyads. This suggests that states, on balance, are not
placing strong emphasis on the relative economic or military strength of their rival. It should be
pointed out however that the methodology employed did not allow for distinctions as to which
state is the attacker and which is the victim – a role that, in some dyads, is interchangeable.
Therefore it is not possible to say with certainty that the attacker is always stronger than the
victim except in dyads where these roles are one-sided.
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There is one interesting result to note among the cyber dyad group. Figure 4.1 outlines
the differentials in GDP (blue) and military expenditure (red) among the cyber dyads. Military
expenditure refers to actual spending, and not military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The
majority of these dyads do not have large differentials and are fairly symmetrical. However the
few exceptions that exist are extreme ones. Russia is an interesting case. There is a very large
difference in the size of their economy and military spending as compared with both Estonia and
Georgia, against whom they launched some of the most severe cyber operations on record. With
the U.S., where there is a less extreme difference but still asymmetry, there have been multiple
cyber interactions yet of a less severe nature, and with other rivals such as Canada, Turkey and
Poland there is much less asymmetry and no recorded cyber events. This could be an indication
that Russia’s strategic decision-making places more emphasis on power differentials – perhaps in
the context of potential for retaliation and likelihood of success - than that of other states. This
would require a more multi-dimensional study than is within the capacity of this thesis. The only
other extreme difference among the cyber group is between the U.S. and Syria which probably
holds little significance, although last year – beyond the time frame of this thesis – the U.S.
considered cyber operations against Syria but reportedly decided against them.
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Figure 4.1 GDP and military expenditure relationships among cyber dyads
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Among the non-cyber dyads that were tested, the majority had only small differences of
less than 10 percent for both GDP and military expenditure. Cases with extreme differences do
exist but always involve a regional power such as Nigeria or a global super power such as the
United States in which asymmetry is to be expected and extends to other measures. These
results were almost exactly consistent with the types of differentials found among the cyber
dyads; therefore it it’s statistically clear economic and military asymmetry does not lead to a
cyber event among rivals.
There is a final point of discussion on this variable. Despite the lack of a positive
correlation between asymmetry and cyber events, I believe that the findings related to nuclear
weapons are somehow relevant here. Nuclear weapon states are among the most influential in the
world albeit to varying degrees. The fact that they appear to be the most active offensive actors
in cyber space – and frequently against one another – indicates that power matters. Power of
course, can be defined many ways, but typically includes some measure for wealth, productivity
or military strength which is why I believe that there is a relationship between these variables
that is relevant to the finding on nuclear weapons and would benefit from additional research.
The nuclear dimension will be further explored in the next chapter.

Hypothesis 3: States are most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident against a rival
when the two rivals are interconnected through trade or bilateral agreements.
The measurements for this variable included two underlying variables – the value of how much
each state imports from the other, and the number of bilateral treaties that exist between the two
countries in the dyad. As stated in the overview, there was not sufficient statistical evidence to
indicate that the hypothesis is correct. There is a slightly higher level of interconnectedness
between the dyads of the cyber group than in the non-cyber group but not one that is statistically
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significant. Perhaps additional research or the use of other variables would reveal more
information.
That there is an increased level of interconnectedness via bilateral treaties is illustrated in
Figure 4.2. The x axis represents the number of dyads – 20 in the cyber group, and 75 in the noncyber group. 75 percent of the cyber dyads (15 dyads) share bilateral treaties, according to the
World Treaty Index, whereas approximately only 49 percent of non-cyber dyads do, a significant
difference. Almost of half of those cyber dyads share more than 50 bilateral treaties; whereas
those in the non-cyber group who have bilaterals do not tend to have very many between them.
The only exception is the U.S. and Canada who share 393 treaties.
Examining the amount of trade between the two countries within each dyad did not
provide any insights. The method used to calculate trade was to identify the dollar amount that
each country in the dyad imports from the other, and average that amount from 2001 – 2009,
which is the last year of the trade data set from which this information was sourced. The sum
was taken of each country’s dependence on the other to calculate dependency. The overall level
of dependency across all dyads was extremely low, too low for this variable to have significance.
The cyber dyad with the highest level is China-Vietnam. Among the non-cyber dyads, the
majority had dependency levels that are also extremely low, albeit with a few exceptions:
Taiwan-Japan, Russia-Ukraine, Iraq-UAE, Iran-Afghanistan, U.S.-Canada, Iraq-Saudi Arabia,
Liberia-Nigeria, Armenia-Azerbaijan. Nearly all of these are neighbors.
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Figure 4.2 The number of dyads that have bilateral treaties between them
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Other variables
The thesis included three other variables – regional difference, civilization difference and
the possession of nuclear weapons.
The data shows that the majority of cyber dyads are from different civilizations but
similar regions. Fifteen out of 20 of these dyads, or 75 percent, include two countries that
represent different groups of the ten civilization types used in this study. This is a strong
majority that suggests that cyber activity takes place more often, or is more likely, among states
of different cultures. The non-users were almost equally divided between being of different (49
percent) or similar (51 percent) civilizations.
Figure 4.3 helps to illustrate from which civilizations the countries included in the data
set come from. Although some countries appear in more than one dyad per dyad grouping, each
has been counted only once in this figure. The most common groups among cyber dyads include
Islamic and Sinic countries; among non-cyber, African, Islamic and Latin American ranked the
highest. Buddhist, Hindu and Japanese are low ranking across cyber and non-cyber groups.
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Figure 4.3 Civilization types of cyber and non-cyber dyads
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The trend is reversed with respect to region. Valeriano and Maness noted that cyber activity is
highly concentrated at the regional level. Eighty percent of the dyads in the cyber group were of
the same geographic region. This is also true of non-cyber rivals though, which indicates less
that rivals are more likely to use cyber tactics against a rival from the region and more that
rivalry, on the whole, is a regional phenomenon. That said, certain regions are more represented
among the cyber group while others are completely absent. Of the 20 countries that make up the
cyber dyads, seven are from East Asia and the Pacific, and six from the Middle East and North
Africa. There are none from Sub-Saharan Africa, and only one from the Western Hemisphere
(the U.S.). The non-cyber group is more mixed. It includes several African nations and several
from the Western Hemisphere, notably South and Central America. The number of European
actors remains low across both groups.
The most surprising result by far from the analysis was the discovery that there is a
highly significant correlation between possessing nuclear weapons and the likelihood of a cyber
event taking place between rivals. As noted at the start of this chapter, the odds of a cyber event
within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if
neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater. The following chapter will
explain this in greater depth.
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Chapter Five – The Nuclear Variable
The regression analysis returned a surprising and potentially significant result. There is a
very high correlation between dyads that include a nuclear weapon state and dyads have
experienced a cyber dispute or incident. The odds of a cyber incident occurring when at least one
state in the rival dyad is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if
both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater. Ninety per cent of the cyber dyads include a
nuclear weapon state whereas only twenty-one percent of non-cyber dyads do. The possession of
nuclear weapons by one or both of the states in each dyad was included as a variable in the
analysis, in part as a factor somewhat analogous to the asymmetry variables and also because of
the interest that some experts have taken in identifying parallels between the nuclear and cyber
spheres. Ultimately, the nuclear variable offers the most explanatory power.
Table 5.1 organizes the dyads from the cyber group by the number of nuclear weapon
states within the dyad. It also shows how many cyber interactions (meaning either a cyber
incident or a cyber dispute) have taken place within the dyad according to the original data set
created by Valeriano and Maness. France and the United Kingdom are the only two nuclear
weapon states that do not have an interaction attributed them per this research although both are
part of rivalries that appear in the non-cyber group.
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Table 5.1 Possession of nuclear weapons and cyber events among rival dyads
No nuclear
weapons
Iraq-Kuwait
South KoreaJapan

# cyber
events
1
7

One nuclear weapon
state
North Korea -Japan
Russia - Georgia
US - Iran
China - Japan
India - Bangladesh
China - Vietnam
US - Syria
China - Philippines
China - Taiwan
North Korea - South
Korea
Lebanon - Israel
Iran - Israel
India - Pakistan
US - Russia
Russia - Estonia

#
cyber
events
1
4
7
7
1
2
1
1
5
11

Both are nuclear weapon
states

# cyber events

US - China
US - North Korea

23
3

China - India

4

2
11
13
3
4
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There does not appear to be any correlation between the number and/or frequency of
cyber interactions and how many states in the dyad have nuclear weapons; meaning that there is
not an increase in cyber activity when there are two nuclear weapon states as rivals rather than
only one. Interestingly, there does appear to be a positive correlation between which country in
the dyad is the nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber event. While
the data set for this thesis is not structured so as to allow for incident or dispute-level analysis,
the original data set prepared by Valeriano and Maness is. For every incident or dispute that they
logged, they identified its initiator (recognizing that attribution is always a challenge). An
examination reveals that frequently, the nuclear weapon state within the dyad is the initiator of
the cyber event. There were 83 cyber events recorded in their research that took place between
rival dyads in which only one country is a nuclear weapon state. In four of those events, the
attack was attributed to both parties, leaving 79 interactions that had a clear initiator. Of those,
67 (or 85 percent) were attributed to the nuclear weapon state.
What are the implications of this result? Apart from significantly increasing the odds of a
cyber dispute or incident occurring, what else can be inferred from the observation that nuclear
weapon states are also the most active state actors in the cyber sphere? Does this denote causality
or is it an intervening variable?
It might be theorized that cyber weapons represent a less destructive, less morally
reprehensible and overall more effective way to achieve important foreign policy goals than the
using nuclear weapons. Yet this is too easy an explanation. It overlooks very basic differences
between nuclear weapons and cyber weapons, however the latter is defined. Nuclear hostilities
pose an immediate and existential threat to humanity. Unless utilised to detonate a nuclear bomb,
the destructive capacity of cyber technology is perhaps more comparable to biological or
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chemical arms. As Martin Libicki of RAND Corporation has remarked, the destruction of cyber
systems could return society to the economy of the 1990s, which would be a huge economic hit,
but a major nuclear war would return us to the Stone Age.80 Similarly, nuclear explosions are
unambiguous and immediate whereas cyber intrusions and actions may go unnoticed for quite
some time. Herein lies the challenge for advocates of applying nuclear deterrence theory to the
cyber sphere – many cyber operations are meant to be, or need to be, covert so as to be effective.
As such, states may prefer to keep their cards close to their chests rather than advertize their
offensive capacity, a striking difference from the nuclear sphere. Another important difference is
that it’s easier to distinguish between the civilian and military uses of nuclear weapons than with
cyber. It’s been noted that nuclear weapons were developed in a purely military context whereas
cyber technology springs from a civilian context; its militarization is what causes the controversy
over its use, regulation and role.
Moreover, cyber technology is being used to achieve objectives or targets that are
relatively low impact. Nuclear weapons have the opposite effect. In reviewing the 45 cyber
disputes compiled by Valeriano and Maness, 28 of these (or 62 per cent) had the objective of
“disruption” which means taking down websites or disrupting online activities. A nuclear bomb
would accomplish these objectives – but also substantially more. Thirteen of the disputes had an
objective of theft or espionage and only four sought behavioral change of the target. Those four
disputes are a minority but it’s worth explaining their context because it reveals that as the stakes
increase so too does the objective of the cyber operation. They are the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War; the Olympic Games cyber dispute between the U.S. and Iran; a dispute between India and
Bangladesh in 2010 and an on-going dispute between the U.S. and China.
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Figure 5.1 Objectives of cyber disputes

Figure 5.2 Targets of cyber disputes and cyber incidents
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A second inference that could be made is that cyber weapon states overlap with nuclear
weapon states because both require a certain level of technological sophistication or resources.
It’s been stated several times that cyber space and cyber weapons represent a cheaper and more
accessible method to achieve foreign policy goals than conventional militaries and certainly
nuclear weapons. This thesis takes the opposite position. While the asymmetry variable was not
statistically significant, as explained in Chapter Four, the results relating to the nuclear variable
do support the view of this thesis or, at the very least, support the nuance intended by Nye when
he writes that, “Power diffusion does not equal power equalization. Large governments still have
more resources. On the internet, all dogs are not equal.”81 The most successful cyber operations

such as Stuxnet still involved significant human and financial resources as well as sophisticated
technology. Of course, it could be argued that not all nuclear weapon states, current or past, are
necessarily wealthy. In some cases, regime or government type may have more to do with the
state having a nuclear weapons programme or arsenal than simple GDP. An area for further
research may be to explore the costs of several cyber operations and compare with nuclear, or
other, weapons development.
A related consideration is if power or prestige will be conferred by having cyber weapons
in the same way that has happened with possessing nuclear weapons. Will the same ‘old boys
club’ of elites continue to dominate security discussions in the twenty-first century in the same
way that they did in the twentieth? This will depend first and foremost on how important cyber
space becomes to security and military doctrine. The United States considers it a ‘fifth domain’
along after air, land, sea and space and it’s certainly an issue gaining rapid traction within
international and regional policy dialogues, as will be outlined in the final chapter of this thesis.
Yet the majority of governments are more concerned with defensive capacity rather than
81
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offensive which leads to a crucial point - in a networked world, traditional strengths quickly
become vulnerabilities. For example, the United States and especially its military is highly
reliant on computer networks, more so than possibly any other state. This means that the same
cyber operation would have far more devastating consequences on the United States than on
China or especially North Korea, described as a “cyber pygmy.”82 As well, the point that was
already made about cyber weapons having developed out of a civilian context versus the military
context of nuclear weapons development is relevant here too. The extremely dual-use nature of
cyber technology and its prevalence in other sectors means that it’s unlikely to become
exclusively the domain of the military, implying that a greater range of actors have a stake and
role to play in cyber space. It is therefore less likely to become an old boys club in the traditional
sense; although this may just be replaced by a new grouping. If this should occur, then it could
become a motivating factor for states to develop this capacity so as to share in that prestige.
A final inference pertains to the future of cyber warfare. If many cyber weapon states are
also nuclear weapon states then it’s possible that they will seek to apply some of the same
theories or strategies that they, and the international community, have used to avoid a nuclear
attack, contain proliferation or reduce arsenals. Deterrence theory is a good example, as it’s
accorded an important role in preventing nuclear war yet also stimulated an arms race. It’s not
clear to what extent deterrence theory as developed in the nuclear context will become a feature
in cyber space. The challenges of attribution are such that it’s not always clear who a
government may be trying to deter from attacking. Moreover, there are a lot of questions
surrounding what retaliation means in a cyber context and how it can be guaranteed.83 Cyber
technology, when used as a weapon, takes many forms and its impact can be so specifically
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tailored, that a standard reprisal or ‘one size fits all’ response may have the same power of
deterrence as simply having a larger nuclear arsenal did. Libicki has written extensively on the
merit of pursuing cyber deterrence policy and ultimately concludes that it’s problematic. In
addition to the points raised above, he has raised other key questions that should be asked as part
of determining if cyber deterrence will become a strategy of the future. They include the
involvement of third parties, how to establish a threshold for response, what messages retaliation
sends, how to avoid escalation and what to do if the attacker has little of value to make
retaliation worthwhile.84
This chapter has explored the significance of the nuclear variable included in this thesis,
which was ultimately the most significant in explaining what causes a cyber interaction between
rival countries, or at least is highly linked to the likelihood of an attack, perhaps as an
intervening variable. It has further explored the data and statistics pertaining to these dyads and
offers the following observations:
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The odds of a cyber event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are
about 10 times greater than if neither does, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times
greater. Hence, many nuclear weapon states are among the most active states in the cyber
sphere. France and the United Kingdom are not recorded as being involved in a cyber
event, per the original data set compiled by Valeriano and Maness.



There does not appear to be any correlation between a dyad having two nuclear weapon
states and a higher number or frequency of cyber interactions than those with only one
nuclear weapon state.



There does seem to be a positive correlation between which country in the dyad is the
nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber interaction. In 85
percent of the cases included the nuclear weapon state was the initiator of the cyber
dispute or incident.

Libicki 39.
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This chapter has further explored potential implications of this finding:


Cyber weapons are not replacing nuclear weapons because they are more acceptable.
There are significant differences between the two and moreover, the objectives and
targets being sought after in cyber operations could not be accomplished by nuclear
weapons, or vice versa.



The overlap between cyber active states and nuclear weapon states may relate to
technological sophistication or wealth, although not every nuclear weapon state is
economically well-developed.



It’s not yet clear if having cyber weapons will become a power symbol allowing a small
group of countries to dominate security dialogues. A move away from the state-centric
realist model towards a more open and liberal international order indicates that this will
not be the case, as does the substantial role that non-state and non-military actors play in
cyber space.



Deterrence theory, as developed in relation to nuclear weapons, cannot be applied
wholesale to cyber space and does not need to be although it’s feasible that states may
look to what they know and recognize from their nuclear history to make sense of cyber
warfare and cyber space.
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Chapter Six – Case Studies
This chapter will present two brief case studies of rival dyads that have experienced a
cyber dispute or incident. The first focuses on China and the United States and the second on
China and Japan. The objective in presenting these case studies is to delve deeper into the
context surrounding inter-state cyber interactions in order to illustrate how states are using cyber
space to advance various foreign policy or security objectives as well as demonstrate how the use
of cyber tactics, in turn, impacts the rivalry dynamics of the dyad. Elements of these rivalries and
their cyber behavior are connected to the ideas that underpin the theories argued in this thesis so
that even while those theories have been ruled out, some of the fundamental thinking behind
them is evident in the cases.
These two cases were selected because they represent differing levels of cyber activity
and are geopolitically connected. China and the U.S. are by far the world’s most cyber-active
dyad. The clear majority of incidents and disputes logged by Valeriano and Maness take place
within this dyad. They are also locked in a highly significant political and economic rivalry that
impacts international relations at a global and a regional level. China and Japan are fierce
regional rivals between whom there have been some cyber interactions although not nearly as
many as between the U.S. and China. In both dyads, there are important power shifts underway.
In addition, the U.S. is Japan’s most important ally against China which adds an extra dimension
of complexity to their cyber and non-cyber dynamics and, for the purpose of this thesis, helps to
illustrate the intricacies of how states are using cyber space in pursuit of their objectives.
Each case study will follow a similar format. It will provide a brief summary of the
overall nature of the relationship between the two states in the dyad. To be consistent with the
analysis of the previous chapters, the summary will touch on the same variables – gross domestic
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product (GDP), military spending, rivalry intensity, trade relationship, etc. – while providing
some new information and commentary. The role of nuclear weapons and particularly the role of
deterrence theory will be briefly discussed for each case. The studies will then describe the
nature of cyber activity between the two rivals – how many interactions, what their purpose is,
impact and severity. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into a detailed account of each and
every cyber interaction and also, it can be difficult to distinguish between unique operations.
Some can be bundled as part of a single cyber campaign but particularly with China and the U.S.,
there is a high level of overlap between operations, and operations are complex. Hence the
decision by Valeriano and Maness to distinguish between disputes and incidents. Unlike
previous chapters, terms like ‘cyber warfare’ and ‘attack’ may be used when they are reflective
of the terminology being used by the country under consideration although the meaning of such
terms is not universally agreed. The case studies will also explain how each state in the dyad
approaches and defines cyber warfare, which is critical to understanding past and current
behaviour as well as the prospects for future cooperation.
Case study 1: China and the United States
Rivalry dynamics
The relationship between China and the United States could perhaps best be described as
an uneasy balance of cooperation and competition, with each of those terms carrying more or
less weight at different moments over the last half century. The crux of the rivalry, at least in
recent years, is Chinese military and economic ascendance juxtaposed against what might be
described as an irreversible decline in American power. The potential implications of this power
shift on international affairs has been studied and written about extensively by scholars, policy
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experts and the media who largely agree that the China-U.S. relationship will be among one of
the most important in the twenty-first century.
This plays out at both regional and global levels where there is regular friction.
American interventions in Asia, particularly in support of Taiwan and Japan, have long
antagonized the Chinese who feel that the U.S. is interfering in their backyard. Globally, both are
nuclear power states with permanent seats on the UN Security Council. China’s unwillingness to
condemn North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean vessel the Cheonan in 2010 or the shelling
of Yeonpyong Island that same year; and Beijing’s veto of UN Security Council resolutions
aimed at imposing sanctions on Syria are recent issues over which the two states have opposed
one another.85
Despite these differences, the two share connections that act as constraints on how far
one state will antagonize the other – including in cyber space. The U.S. is China’s second largest
export market, while China is third for the U.S. Two-way investment totaled more than $55
billion in 2012.86 The World Treaty Index reports 54 bilateral agreements between the two
nations and several other informal pledges exist, including some recent ones pertaining to
climate and limiting the nuclear weapons programmes of Iran and North Korea. In 2013, the two
states agreed to convene a working group on cyber security.87 Some feel that these ties are what
hold the two superpowers back from engaging in a direct confrontation such as through a
military strike or economic measures.
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In terms of symmetry, the U.S. is still economically and militarily larger. In 2013, the
U.S. spent $640 billion USD in military expenditures which equals 3.8 percent of its GDP. China
spent an estimated $188 billion USD, or 2.0 percent of its GDP on its military in the same year.
However, China’s spending represents a 7.4 percent increase from 2012 while the U.S. is
attempting to reduce its military budget. It’s not clear how this difference will impact actual
military capacity though. As will be discussed, much of China’s cyber activity has been premised
on infiltrating U.S. defense contractors and military databases in order to extract information
about, among other things, weapons development. This could enable China to ‘leapfrog’ over
U.S. military capabilities although doing so, and maintaining an advantage, requires domestic
expertise and technological capacity, among other things. This corresponds with Nye Jr.’s
theory of cyber power, as described in Chapter Two.
The U.S. economy remains larger than China’s for now but that is predicted to shift in
coming years. The Chinese economy is growing much more rapidly than the U.S. is, at an
annual rate of around seven percent (the U.S. economy is growing at only around two percent).
The Economist predicts that China will re-emerge as the world’s largest economy in 2021
although others believe that it could happen sooner, or that depending on the unit of
measurement, it may have already happened.88
China and the U.S. scored among the highest for rivalry intensity among all dyads
included in this data set. This reflects the multiple trade disputes that have been registered at the
WTO between them, the duration of their rivalry as well as the number of MIDs that have taken
place between them (36). There was not a direct territorial dispute included, although American
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support for territory claimed by its allies in the region against China certainly takes place but the
methodology included only direct and not proxy disputes.
Both China and the U.S. have nuclear weapons. Their dynamics in this regard are largely
considered to be stable but are certainly an important component of their rivalry dynamics and
thus impacted by other facets of their relationship.89 For example, China has a no first-use policy
that acts as a positive confidence building measure yet on the other hand, has been rapidly
modernizing their arsenal with the objective of arming their submarine fleet. These submarines
could reach U.S. territory, such as Hawaii. China continues to be concerned about U.S. missile
defence activities in the region. These activities are largely intended as defensive response to
North Korea but the proximity to China has made its leaders uneasy. The American arsenal is
vastly larger than the Chinese; they own approximately 4,804 nuclear warheads that include
tactical, strategic and non-deployed weapons. China has around only 250 warheads in total.90
This information provides the necessary context and backdrop for studying Chinese and
American cyber activity. The two states are in a complex rivalry that includes both competition
and the need to cooperate on issues of high importance. Their respective roles in the world are
changing and that resonates on many levels and in many sectors. There is often disagreement and
sometimes strong words between the two, although there have not been any direct confrontations
during the time frame that this thesis covers. As will be shown in the next sub-section cyber
activity is, particularly for the Chinese, rapidly becoming an ideal avenue through which to
obtain valuable information and advance their goals for expansion. These activities are to the
detriment of the United States however, who are primarily adopting an offensive posture in
response although developing thorough defensive measures are critical.
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The cyber dimension
In the cyber sphere, Chinese and American dynamics are largely characterized by the
same patterns as in the kinetic world. There are regular, and increasing, levels of antagonistic
cyber activity yet it seems to be maintained at a fairly constant (and so far mutually tolerated)
intensity level. There have been public statements of frustration by senior officials from both
countries and it is recognized that this issue is becoming an ever larger bone of contention. It is
one of the issues that could send their relationship into a tail spin, according to one expert.91 The
U.S. views China as “The most threatening actor in cyber space.”92 Some officials describe the
current situation as reminiscent of the Cold War.93 This belief is not without merit. Many
Chinese-sponsored cyber operations that have targeted the U.S. have been damaging in the sense
that the information obtained was highly sensitive. In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama put
the issue of cyber espionage at the top of the U.S.-China agenda while administration officials
warned of potential consequences if China continued cyber hacking to steal American
intellectual property.94 Prominent former U.S. officials such as Dennis Blair and Jon Huntsman,
as well as members of the U.S. Congress, have explicitly called for the imposition of sanctions
on China for its use of cyber to gain economic advantage.95
China however, sees itself as a victim of American cyber attacks. In addition, China
believes that the U.S. has a stronger position in the cyber community because of its early role in
pioneering and hosting the Internet. In 2011 it claimed to be the target of 34,000 cyber attacks
from the United States.96 Such a large number seems unlikely, particularly as compared with the
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counting system used in the data set, but likely reflects a definition of attack that includes single
and specific activities whereas Valeriano and Maness used wider operations including many
activities as their base unit. In 2013 the revelations about the American National Security
Agency (NSA) surveillance by Edward Snowden somewhat undermined American credibility on
the cyber issue though. It was revealed that the NSA had hacked into Tsinghua University in
Beijing, which is home to one of six critical networks through which all of mainland China’s
Internet traffic is routed including an important fibre-optic network for the Asia-Pacific region.97
Valeriano and Maness identified five cyber disputes between the two countries in the
2001 – 2011 timeframe and 22 smaller incidents that took place as part of those larger disputes.
Again, it should be acknowledged that there are significant challenges with attributing operations
and obtaining information about their implementation. This means that there could be other
operations not included here or that the start and end dates are not accurate. Yet their research
goes a very long way in collating and organizing data about these interactions and allows for
observations about the U.S. and China to be made.
First, the majority of disputes and incidents (63 percent) had a severity level of two, out
of a possible five. Two was coded to mean a “Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or
military.” None had a severity level of more than three, which would be defined as a “Dramatic
effect on a country's specific strategy.” As such, it can be observed that cyber interactions
between the U.S. and China are not very severe – although this is also true of most interactions
included in the data set. A second observation tells us more about the nature of the interactions.
Sixty three percent, or 17 out of 27 interactions (which combines disputes and incidents), are
labelled as an offensive strike. Nineteen percent are considered to be a nuisance; 11 percent are
defensive operations and 7 percent combine nuisance, defensive and offensive elements. This
97
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shows that while many operations are bothersome, most others are quite literally, offensive.
Valeriano and Maness only rated the objectives of disputes and not incidents. Among the five
Chinese-American disputes in their data set, three were intended “to be disruptive” and two were
undertaken for “theft and espionage”. None were intended to induce a change in behavior. The
U.S. is recorded as the initiator of two of 27 cyber interactions.
What do these incidents and disputes look like in reality? The five disputes included in
the data set all include at least one incident. The largest dispute (“Chinese govt theft operations
and US Response”) includes 14 incidents between 2003 and 2011, some of which are extremely
high profile and presented a significant security dilemma for the U.S. government. They all
involve espionage and theft. In 2006, for example, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) had to dispose of all of its computers after intrusive attacks that were
traced to China.98 BIS is where export licenses for technology items to China are issued. Titan
Rain is the name given to large-scale hacking operation attributed to a team of government
sponsored researchers in Guangdong Province in China. The hackers stole information from
military labs, NASA, the World Bank, and others.99 The 2009 revelation that defense contractors
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems had been penetrated and significant
amounts of information relating to the development of the F-35 shocked many in both
government and the defense industry. Hackers used software that encrypted the data as it was
being stolen making it more difficult for investigators to discover exactly what had been taken.
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Apparently they were in BAE Systems’ networks for 18 months before being discovered and
were able to monitor online meetings and technical discussions.100
Another category of disputes is referred to by Valeriano and Maness as “Chinese
Defacements” and includes five incidents. One of these is the “Wolf defacement” in which the
office computers of U.S. Congressman Fred Wolf were compromised by Chinese-government
sponsored hackers in 2006. Wolf is an outspoken lawmaker with respect to Chinese human
rights issues.101
The Hainan Island incident in 2001 is one of the cyber incidents in the data set that is
directly tied to a real world crisis between the two countries. It occurred in April 2001 when an
American reconnaissance plane on an eavesdropping mission collided with a Chinese interceptor
jet over the South China Sea. The Chinese jet crashed, and its pilot was killed, but the pilot of the
American aircraft made an emergency landing at a Chinese base on Hainan Island, 15 miles from
the mainland.102 The officers on board returned home within days, but the plane stayed behind.
As the technology through which they had been eavesdropping was not properly destroyed by
the officers before the landing, the Chinese were able to reverse-engineer the plane’s operating
system which included an estimated thirty to fifty million lines of computer code supplied by the
NSA. Doing this gave China a veritable road map for decrypting the Navy’s classified
intelligence and operational data.103 The extent of this information grab only became apparent
years later however; the immediate fall-out of the incident was more diplomatic in nature as the
U.S. was pressured into issuing a letter of apology amid renewed debate about access to the
airspace.
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The two operations included in the data set which are U.S.-led are code named Cisco
Raider and Buckshot Yankee. Cisco Raider enabled the U.S. and other states to halt counterfeit
software coming in from China. Buckshot Yankee was a defensive operation developed after an
infected thumb drive was inserted into a U.S. military laptop on a base in the Middle East.104 The
malware on the thumb drive, named Agent.btz, was able to replicate itself extensively and
unobtrusively throughout the American military’s networks and even impacting NATO. When it
was discovered it prompted a massive wake-up call and led to dramatic changes to how the U.S.
structures its cyber policies.105
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it’s not feasible to go into the details of each
interaction as part of this case study. Table 6.1 lists all the incidents and disputes between China
and the United States identified in the Valeriano and Maness data set, and further indicates the
initiator, severity level, objective and type of operation. What is important to take away from this
information is that the majority of cyber interactions are Chinese-initiated. Most involve
espionage or theft of information, some of it highly important to U.S. military and strategic
interests. There have been some website defacements as well. There have not been any seriously
demobilizing attacks to key systems or infrastructure belonging to either the Chinese or the U.S.
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Table 6.1 Cyber incidents and disputes between China and Japan, 2001-2011 (Based on the
Cyber Incidents and Disputes Dataset 1.0 compiled by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness)
Name of dispute or incident
Date range
China-US 1
4/29/2001 - 5/1/2001
Hainan Island Incident
4/29/2001 - 5/1/2001
Chinese govt theft operations
and US Response
1/1/2003 - Ongoing

Initiator
China
China

Titan Rain

1/1/2003 - 4/1/2006

China

Shady RAT

8/1/2006 - 1/1/2010

China

State Dept theft

01/01/2006 - 7/7/2006

China

GhostNet

5/27/2007 - 8/1/2009

China

Cisco Raider
2008 Campaign hack

2/29/2006 - 5/6/2010
8/1/2008 - 8/04/2008

U.S.
China

Night Dragon

11/1/2009 - 2/11/2011

China

Commerce theft
Buckshot Yankee

11/1/2009 - 11/5/2009
4/29/2010 - 5/1/2010

China
U.S.

Penatgon Raid

3/1/2011 - 3/10/2011

China

F-35 plans stolen

3/29/2009 - 4/1/2009

China

White House theft
Seantor Nelson theft

11/7/2011 - 11/8/2011
3/1/2009 - 3/1/2009

China
China

Byzantine series

10/30/2008 - 6/30/2011

China

Chinese Defacements
Fred Wolf defacement

8/1/2006 - 12/5/2007
8/1/2006 - 8/1/2006

China
China

Commerce disable

10/1/2006 - 10/7/2006

China

Naval War College disable
Commerce Sec hack

12/1/2006 - 12/07/2006
12/1/2007 - 12/5/2007

China
China

750,000 American zombies

3/1/2007 - 9/23/2010

China

Aurora

6/1/2009 - 1/1/2010

China

Google hacked and info stolen

6/1/2009 - 1/1/2010

China

Htran

1/1/2010 - 2/1/2010

China

Htran

1/1/2010 - 2/1/2010

China

*Disputes are bolded

China

Objective

Severity

Type

Disruption (1) Minimal damage (1)

Nuisance (1)

Minimal damage (1)

Nuisance (1)

Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)

Nuisance, defensive and
offensive (7)

Minimal damage (1)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)

Nuisance (1)

Minimal damage (1)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)

Defensive operation (2)

Theft (2)

Minimal damage (1)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
Disruption (1) infrastructure or military (2)
Minimal damage (1)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Minimal damage (1)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Theft (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
Disruption (1) infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)

Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Defensive operation (2)

Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)

Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Nuisance (1)
Nuisance (1)
Nuisance, defensive and
offensive (7)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Nuisance (1)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
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Perspectives and responses
The Chinese view on cyber matters is different from the American perspective in a few
key ways. First, China views “cyber security” as synonymous with “information security” which
is a broader term that includes controlling the content of information available online, somewhat
connected to issues of Internet freedom.106 The vast majority of Chinese actions in cyber space
against other countries are done in pursuit of information, as demonstrated by some of the
interactions described above. They seem to believe that the economic espionage they are
conducting is within the range of acceptable behaviour between rivals; it is less about hostility
and more about self-interest. The problem however is that the Chinese do not distinguish
between industrial or economic espionage and espionage through which information critical to
national security can be obtained.107 Needless to say, the U.S. does not agree with this point of
view; President Obama once described it as the difference between stealing Apple’s intellectual
property and trying to steal his talking points before speaking with the Japanese.108 Any of the
espionage and hacking operations described in this chapter reinforces this point. One of the
reasons why China is placing such emphasis on information collection stems from their concern
about being too dependent on foreign technology and their desire to transition away from labor
and energy intensive industrial sectors, which tend also to be high polluting. To do this, China
has significantly increased its focus on science and technology. Investment in research and
development, for example, has grown by almost 20 percent a year since 1999 and topped $160
billion in 2012.109 Yet as Chinese leaders have reportedly been disappointed at the pace of
domestic growth, they are looking further afield and for ways to shortcut the research and
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development process. This has led to an expansion in their cyber espionage operations and
targets over the last five years to include not only military networks but also high-technology and
advanced manufacturing companies.110
Perhaps most relevant to the findings of this thesis is that China views cyber capability as
having a strong deterring effect on its rivals, particularly the U.S. Its analysts have argued that,
given U.S. vulnerability in this area and the potentially widespread impact of a cyber operation,
the U.S. will be deterred from becoming involved in a regional conflict.111 It is speculated that
this is why sometimes Chinese cyber operations are more obvious than at other times – it is
being done intentionally and as a warning.112 An interesting avenue of further research would be
determine if there is a correlation between these more noisy operations and moments where the
U.S. is considering taking action on an contentious issue.
Where the two states are similar is in their response. Both have made cyber a top security
priority and are rapidly developing their capacity in this arena, leading to concerns from others
about a pending cyber arms race. In China, this is guided by a concept called informatization,
somewhat akin to modernization in a time when information technology is pivotal.113 It’s
difficult to know what this will look like in practice, as there are no formal articulations of
Chinese cyber space policy. Based on the writing of some People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
analysts though, it can be surmised that China will seek to knock out an adversary’s command
and control center through both cyber and kinetic attacks with follow-up attacks targeting
communication, transportation and logistics networks to slow down the enemy.114
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The Americans are guided by a concept called equivalence. Essentially, equivalence
means being able to retaliate through non-cyber (kinetic) means if the magnitude of the cyber
attack on the U.S. should warrant it.115 It’s a way to navigate how threats shift between the cyber
and non-cyber spheres as well maintaining freedom to maneuver. It’s also rooted in deterrence
theory - by demonstrating sufficient capacity to retaliate, whether through malware or air strikes,
a would-be attacker will theoretically hesitate to move forward. The problem with this approach
is that deterrence is somewhat awkwardly applied to cyber space, as explained in Chapter Five.
This approach also places a very heavy emphasis on offensive capability; the 2014 U.S. Air
Force budget allocated significantly more resources to offensive than defensive capability which
is highly problematic for a nation as networked as the United States is.116 This point also
underscores the seriousness with which the U.S. military structures are now treating cyber space
and their intention to establish dominance there. The U.S. was caught off guard several times in
the early years of cyber warfare and is now determined to not let it happen again. The current
plan involves four objectives: to treat cyberspace as an operational domain; to implement new
security concepts to succeed in that domain; to build relationships with international partners;
and to develop new talent to spur innovation in how the military might fight and win in this
space.117 While offensive capability will be important, the U.S. is very vulnerable to attack and
equal emphasis should be placed on defence.
Responsibility for the above rests with Cyber Command, otherwise known as
CYBERCOM. Created in 2010, the body brings together all components of the U.S. military that
work on cyber issues. It shares a director with the NSA and is growing rapidly in terms of
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personnel and budget.118 This has raised some concerns about blurred lines of responsibility and
accountability, although others worry that CYBERCOM is not distinct enough from the military.
What will be important going forward is that there is an appropriate level of civilian involvement
through transparent democratic processes and dialogue on the subject.119
It’s less clear where within the Chinese government the responsibility for cyber
operations are based. At least six different agencies and ministries – the Ministry of Public Security,
State Encryption Bureau, State Secrets Bureau, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, and People’s Liberation Army – have input on cyber security policy. Very
recently, in February 2014, China announced the first meeting of a leading group on “Internet
security and informatization.” The group is chaired by President Xi Jinping, while Premier Li
Keqiang and Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the
director of the Propaganda Department, serve as the group’s deputies.120 The formation of this group
and its high-level composition sends a powerful signal about the importance that China attaches to
cyber security.
Beyond the Chinese government and military, and unlike in the U.S., non-state actors play an
extremely active role in Chinese cyber operations. These are the cells and groups of hackers and
software engineers whose precise connection to the Chinese government is not clear but are largely
suspected of receiving support in order to carry out Chinese espionage operations. The security firm
Mandiant has been studying these groups for several years; they refer to them as an ‘advanced
persistent threat’ (APT), a term described in Chapter Three. In 2013 they released a groundbreaking
report focusing on one such group, APT1, which is a single organization of operators that has
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conducted cyber espionage campaigns against a broad range of victims since at least 2006.121
Mandiant tracked APT1 back to four large networks in Shanghai, two of which are allocated directly
to the Pudong New Area. They concluded that APT1 is likely government-sponsored and one of the
most persistent of China’s cyber threat actors, capable of waging a long-running and extensive cyber
espionage campaign through government support. Mandiant further discovered that the PLA’s Unit
61398 is similar to APT1 in its mission, capabilities, and is located in the same area from which
APT1 activity appears to originate – signs which further point to close connections with the Chinese
government.
The non-state actor element is an interesting one that further complicates efforts at
cooperation between the U.S. and China. In addition to the strong possibility of direct sponsorship,
some experts describe other methods that the Chinese government has used to elicit support from
these cells such as through propaganda and messaging. By deliberating painting a view of the world
in which China is under constant attack from its enemies, the government has subliminally
encouraged its citizens to voluntarily strike back through hacking or other cyber activities, which
then becomes an act of patriotism rather than criminal activity. 122 It’s extremely difficult to know
how many such actors exist within China or to what extent they are affiliated with authorities and
what level of control authorities have. This will continue to be a complicating factor for any effort to
regulate activity in cyber space.

It’s difficult to know to what extent the nuclear capabilities of either nation factor into the
strategic thinking on cyber. Both states have indicated that kinetic attacks play a role in their
cyber policies and that the ability to deter their enemies involves kinetic capabilities alongside
cyber ones. Of course, this does not explicitly mean nuclear weapons and it is hoped that almost
70 years of non-use of nuclear weapons won’t be broken now in the context of a cyber operation.
121
122

Mandiant Intelligence Center, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” February 18, 2013.
Jason Q. Ng, October 11, 2014.

80

The Chinese arsenal is significantly smaller than the American but they have been modernizing
and expanding with the aim of being fully capable on land, sea and air. The fact that both are
nuclear powers gives rise to at least one interesting question – would the severity of the cyber
interactions between these two countries be more severe if the other was not a nuclear weapon
state? Of course, the same could also be asked about military capacity and economic strength in
general, and if relative power is what has kept the situation stable so far. The second case study
on China and Japan will demonstrate different dynamics in the severity and nature of cyber
interactions.
Summary
This brief look at the cyber and non-cyber relationship between China and the United
States has generated the following observations. Both states seek dominance and strength in the
cyber domain, as an extension of their power in the non-cyber world and in response to their own
perception of being a victim of the attacks of the other. They are investing significant financial
and human resources in pursuit of this goal. The American framework for cyber policy and
operations is more clearly defined than the Chinese, and with China there is a high level of
activity among non-state actors. The U.S. is the more vulnerable of the two nations and the
Chinese are aware of and seek to exploit this. For the most part, Chinese cyber operations have
focused on theft and espionage with no distinction between private industry and matters of U.S.
national security. Frustration has been publicly expressed by both countries yet neither has
responded with a show of strength that would dramatically escalate their competition. Overall,
tension in the cyber sphere is becoming a complicating factor in their rivalry, a rivalry with
significant implications for the international landscape.

81

The above conditions would indicate that the two states are on a cyber collision course.
Yet there are strong incentives for them to cooperate as much as possible. These are rooted as
much in their economic relationship as well as in rational interests in preserving peace. While not
perfect equals, both are sufficiently balanced in strength and influence that the fall-out of fullblown conflict, whether on cyber or other issues of contention, is itself a powerful deterrent. The
Working Group established by the two countries in 2013 creates a positive forum for this but it’s
yet to be seen what the outputs will be.
Case Study 2: China and Japan
Rivalry dynamics
The relationship between China and Japan is an important one both within the Asian
region and globally. It is a rivalry with deep historic roots and one that closely involves China’s
primary adversary, the United States. Throughout history Japan has been strongly influenced by
China in its language, architecture, culture, religion, philosophy, and law. Their power dynamics
have typically been clear cut, with one country always being more prosperous or powerful than
the other. Prior to the nineteenth century, China was usually dominant but following the Meiji
Restoration in 1868 and the move to modernization, Japan has generally been preeminent.123
Since the end of the Second World War, their relationship has waxed and waned in tandem with
the rise and fall of each country’s economic strength and political clout. It has only been in more
recent years that the two have reached a sort of parity – albeit with the important distinction that
China's economy and influence have grown rapidly, and will likely to continue to do so, while
Japan's are becoming stagnant.124 Yet both are among the strongest economies in the world and
certainly in the Asian region. The two account for nearly three-quarters of the region's economic
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activity.125 They have a deep history of being significant trading partners although political
disputes, most recently in 2012, have interfered with that. Following Japanese nationalization of
disputed island in East China Sea trade, for example, China boycotted Japanese goods leading to
a 13.8 per cent plunge in Japanese exports to China.126 It is predicted that trade relations will
return to normal as of 2014 but it’s entirely possible that another political incident could
challenge that.
The military dimension of their rivalry is unique, notably because of the involvement of
the U.S. In many ways, China is by far the stronger military power. They possess nuclear
weapons and have the second highest military budget in the world. Japan has had a ‘peace
constitution’ since the end of World War II (WWII) in which they renounced the right to wage
war. That constitution, which also enacted a parliamentary system, replaced the militaristic and
monarchist system. To ensure its protection however, Japan and the U.S. signed the Mutual
Security Treaty in 1951, which was updated in 1960. In exchange for protection the U.S. was
permitted to establish military bases in the Japanese archipelago. This gave the Americans an
additional toe-hold in the region, an aggravating factor for the Chinese. The alliance has been the
pillar of U.S. policy in the Pacific for over half a century.127
In 2012, Japan turned an important corner when Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime
Minister, announced his intention to increase Japanese military spending. In August 2014, the
Japanese defence ministry made a record budget request of 5.5 trillion yen ($53 billion USD)
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making it the third year in a row that saw a rise in Japanese military spending.128 The defence
build-up is said to be aimed at deterring an attack on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands claimed by
both China and Japan.129 Japan has also recently relaxed its ban on arms exports. These moves
have made waves across the region, where fears of Japanese re-militarization loom large.130 It
has particular meaning for the Chinese. As one expert explains, “The War of Resistance Against
Japan, as the Chinese call their version of World War II, lasted more than twice as long as
Japan's conflict with the United States; it had already been raging for more than four years when
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. By the time the war ended, it had caused far more casualties and
atrocities than had the bitter struggle between Japan and the United States.”131
Territorial disputes are an important facet of the China – Japan rivalry. As touched on
above, the two countries disagree over the sovereignty of a cluster of islets, known as Senkaku in
Japanese or Diaoyu in Chinese. Japan currently has administrative control over the islands and
does not recognize the existence of a dispute over the islands.132 The dispute is rooted in energy
reserves reported to be beneath these islands which could become an important and badly needed
source of ‘domestic’ reserves.133 The last few years have seen the dispute flare up as a result of
moves from both parties. In 2010, China accused Japan of changing their agreed status quo on
the region when they arrested a Chinese fishing vessel captain after the vessel rammed a
Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the islands. China sees the Japanese Government's purchase of
some of the islands from their private owner in 2012 as a provocative action, while Japan is
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frustrated with China’s announcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that
includes the air space above the island.134
A final dimension of the rivalry that is important to highlight pertains to the cultural
relationship between the Chinese and Japanese people. There has been increasing animosity
between Japanese and Chinese people in recent years. A 2014 BBC World Service Poll showed
that only three percent of Japanese people view China's influence positively, with 73 percent
expressing a negative view of it. Meanwhile, only five percent of Chinese people view Japanese
influence positively, with 90 percent expressing a negative view – which is the most negative
perception of Japan in the world.135
The paragraphs above have described different elements of the rivalry between China and
Japan, touching on many of the same variables used by this thesis. This includes economic and
military strength, their trade relationship, territorial disputes, possession of nuclear weapons by
China and cultural issues. It’s clear that they are from the same region. With respect to the other
variables, there are 45 bilateral treaties between China and Japan according the World Treaty
Index. There are three very recent trade disputes registered with the WTO, although two have
been resolved. The MID dataset records only seven disputes between the two. MIDs are noncyber. There are other issues of contention within the rivalry, such as the Korean peninsula and
Taiwan, which continue to complicate the relationship. In both of those issues the U.S. plays a
role.
The cyber dimension
The cyber dynamic between China and Japan is different than the one between China and
the U.S., reflecting the different nature of each rivalry. There are fewer (known) incidents and
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disputes and so far, it’s been entirely one-sided. Japan is not known to have initiated any hostile
cyber operations against other countries and there are none included in this data set, although
there have been allegations from China and South Korea of Japanese-led operations. Several of
the Chinese operations against the Japanese are a direct retaliation for perceived slights and
affronts in the kinetic, non-cyber world. In this respect, China has used cyber technology in a
more ‘weapon-like’ way against Japan than it has against the U.S., although it also uses it in
pursuit of information.
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Table 6.2 Cyber incidents and disputes between China and Japan, 2001-2011 (Based on the
Cyber Incidents and Disputes Dataset 1.0 compiled by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness)
Name of dispute or incident
*Disputes are bolded

Date range

Initiator

Objective Severity

Type

Disruption
(1)

Offensive strike (3)

Htran

1/1/2001 - 2/1/2001

China

Htran

1/1/2001 - 2/1/2001

China

1/6/2005 - 5/15/2005
1/6/2005 - 5/15/2005

China

WWII Memorial
Hack and extort

12/27/2007 - 6/1/2008

China

Hack and extort

12/27/2007 - 6/1/2008

China

Earthquake hack

3/11/2010 - 3/14/2010

China

Earthquake hack

3/11/2010 - 3/14/2010

China

WWII Memorial

China

09/14/2010 - 9/17/2010
09/14/2010 - 9/17/2010

China

East China Sea Dispute
Mitsibishi Hack

09/01/2011 - 11/4/2011

China

Mitsibishi Hack

09/01/2011 - 11/4/2011

China

Parliament Hack

10/25/2011 - 11/2/2011
10/25/2011 - 11/2/2011

China

East China Sea Dispute

Parliament Hack

Disruption
(1)

Theft (2)

Theft (2)

Disruption
(1)

China

China

Theft (2)

Disruption
(1)

Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)

Offensive strike (3)

Minimal damage (1)

Offensive strike (3)

Minimal damage (1)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)
Targeted attacked on critical
infrastructure or military (2)

Offensive strike (3)

Minimal damage (1)

Offensive strike (3)

Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Offensive strike (3)

Minimal damage (1)
Offensive strike (3)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Dramatic effect on a country's specific
strategy (3)
Offensive strike (3)
Minimal damage (1)

Offensive strike (3)

Minimal damage (1)

Offensive strike (3)
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The data set includes seven cyber disputes between China and Japan during 2001 and
2011. Each dispute has only one incident tied to it, meaning that the two types of interactions
have been bundled together. The objective of four of those interactions was disruption, while
three was to steal sensitive information or strategies – a near even split. All are classified as an
offensive strike by Valeriano and Maness and none as a nuisance, which is an important
difference from the China-U.S. interactions. It’s demonstrates more aggression as well as
consistency in purpose. In terms of severity, one interaction (the Mitsubishi hack) was rated a
three, meaning that the impact of the operation was a ‘dramatic effect on a country’s specific
strategy’ while the other interactions were evenly divided between rankings of one (‘minimal
damage’) and two (‘targeted attack on critical infrastructure or military’). As with the previous
case study, these details have been outlined in Table 6.2. It’s difficult to notice trends with so
few cases and also where the ratings for each variable are distributed more or less equally across
their respective scales.
As stated above, some of these operations appear to be direct retaliation for actions
undertaken by Japanese government officials. For example, in 2004, Chinese hackers connected
to the China Federation of Defending Diaoyu Islands attacked multiple Japanese websites. 136
They stated that this was in response to Japanese cyber operations against a pro-Chinese website
although there is little available evidence to support that. Similar operations occurred in 2010
and are noted in the data set. One came on the heels of the fishing vessel incident described
earlier in this chapter and the second took place amidst the chaos induced by the earthquake and
while tensions with China were still very high as a result of the dispute over the islands. The first
incident involved a denial of service operation that made it virtually impossible to access defence
136
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ministry and national police agency websites. In the second operation, ‘trapdoors’ were sent via
email to Japanese government and private websites leading to the theft of critical information.
There have been multiple operations that are related to a Japanese World War II memorial
considered offensive by the Chinese as it includes the names of the fallen from Japan's wars,
including 14 convicted Class A war criminals. For example (and not included in the data set), is
a 2001 attack from hackers linked to the Honkers Union of China that targeted the servers of
multiple Japanese agencies. The hackers simultaneously issued statements criticizing the visit of
then-Prime Minister Koizumi to the shrine. When the Prime Minister visited the site again in
2005, Chinese hackers tried to deface Japanese government websites.137
In addition to illustrating the retaliatory and more overtly hostile nature of some Chinese
operations against Japan, the above examples demonstrate the role that non-state actors and socalled ‘hacktivists’ play in the China context as mentioned in the previous case study. They also
show that actions in cyber space very closely align with the same issues that are central to this
rivalry – in particular, territorial disputes and lingering tension from WWII and Japan’s
militaristic past.
The interactions aimed at theft and espionage took place between 2008 and 2011. The
most notorious is known as the Mitsubishi hack of 2011. Around 80 virus-infected computers
were found at the Mitsubishi’s headquarters in Tokyo as well as at manufacturing and research
and development sites. At least eight different kinds of computer viruses including Trojan horses
were identified.138 Information relating to the design of weapons such as surface-to-air Patriot
missiles and AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles as well as highly sophisticated submarines was
compromised by the operation.
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Only one month after the Mitsubishi hacking operation was discovered, the personal
computers of three representatives in Japan’s lower house of Parliament and a server were found
to have been infected by viruses.139 Researchers discovered that one of the screens used to begin
the attacks was written in the simplified Chinese characters used in mainland China, although no
formal allegation was made. China denied any involvement. Following the discovery of these
two operations, the Japanese government began to take the external threat of cyber security far
more seriously.
Perspectives and responses
The previous case study described the Chinese perspective and approach to cyber
security. Rather than repeat that information, this section will focus mostly on how Japan has
responded to the cyber threats they’ve encountered while also outlining various efforts at
regional cooperation.
Japan’s response to antagonistic cyber behavior has been slow but, similar to many other
nations, is rapidly becoming a national security priority. For much of the last two decades, the
country had focused on domestic problems of cyber crime and improving the security of
computerized networks both within government and especially in private industry. Like the
American experience with the emergence of the Internet, the military has only recently become
involved and cyber security has largely been connected to commercial interests. There was for
many years a tension between government efforts to introduce regulations that aimed to provide
security and a liberal business culture.140
This changed with the Mitsubishi and Parliament attacks, prompting the government to
take more decisive action to protect its businesses and own offices and departments from
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international attackers. In March 2012 the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) of
Japan and eight Japanese electronics companies established a “Control System Security Center
(CSSC).” CSSC is a technology research association designed to strengthen the security of
control systems of important infrastructure and to establish verification methods and evaluation
of control systems.141 In collaboration with eighteen companies including manufacturers,
vendors, and consumers of control systems, the CSSC opened a test-bed laboratory for the
security of control systems in Miyagi, Tohoku on May 17, 2013. The lab has several objectives:
1) to provide the latest security verification tools for controls systems, 2) to develop secure
technology for control systems, 3) to drive international system security standardization, 4) to
develop certification tools, 5) to provide incident support, 6) to develop human resources, and 7)
to establish security guidelines.142
There has been speculation as to whether or not Japan is developing an offensive cyber
capability. What is known is that the Japanese are developing automated software meant to
identify and disable the botnets usually involved in espionage and theft operations.143
Technically, this constitutes malware and could be viewed by some as a weapon, even if it’s
intended as a counter measure. This is controversial for the Japanese because so far, offensive
actions in cyber space also fall under the purview of the peace constitution. Therefore being able
to legally deploy this software even in self-defense would require significant changes to the
constitution. Bearing in mind other changes in the Japanese approach to defense – increased
spending, the relaxation of their arms export ban – it becomes evident that the cyber security
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measures described above are occurring in a time of fundamental change in Japanese defense
policy and what could be a new era of self-reliance.
What could that mean for the China-Japan rivalry, or for the American-Japanese security
alliance? It could lead to increased hostile operations from the Chinese or, depending on where
Japanese cyber capability goes, and the extent to which the Chinese apply their theories of
deterrence to their own actions, deter them. The fact that several of the known cyber interactions
against Japan mirror conflict outside of cyber space is worrisome. At the moment, Japan has
cyber-related agreements in place with both China and the U.S., although each is different in
nature. The agreement with China also includes South Korea and is a confidence building
measure among the region. The 2005 China-Japan-South Korea (CJK) agreement created links
between the Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) operating in each country and has
facilitated information sharing, procedures for handling attacks, and developing approaches for
decreasing the likelihood of retaliation.144 While the agreement was a positive step forward it
evidently has not gone far enough to prevent further operations between the neighbors.
A Japan with enhanced cyber capabilities would be a boost for American defenses
against China. The allies have made it clear through a series of public statements over the last
two years that cyber security is “also an important line of effort in the U.S.-Japan alliance,
ensuring that our practices, our standards, our procedures are as strong and robust as they can be,
because that’s the thing – that’s the foundation for everything else that we do together.”145 At the
same time, a more independent Japan that is less reliant on American protection could alter this.
Part of the protection that Japan enjoys from the U.S. is being under its nuclear umbrella. As
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with the other case study, there is no way to know exactly how nuclear weapons possession
factors into decisions on cyber operations. What can be observed is that the attacks on Japan
included in the data set have tended to be more aggressive and closely connected to real world
rivalry dynamics and politics than those against the United States.
Summary
This case study has briefly reviewed the nature of the rivalry between China and Japan.
This is a rivalry with a deep history that has sustained many power shifts between the two
countries. Currently China is the stronger country but Japan is not far behind at all, especially in
terms of economic strength. It has taken some assertive steps in terms of its defense policies. Key
issues between the two countries include territorial disputes over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands
which is rooted in their respective energy needs; North Korea, and Taiwan. Japan enjoys the
military protection of the U.S., which is China’s primary global rival, adding an extra layer of
complexity to the dynamics. There are seven cyber interactions in the data set between China and
Japan, all of them initiated by China. Their severity, on average, is higher than the severity of
interactions between China and the U.S. Several of these cyber incidents are directly correlated
to non-cyber incidents considered provocative by the Chinese, such as the seizure of disputed
territory or high level visits to a controversial war memorial. It’s extremely interesting to note
that on those occasions the response from China was through cyber means; it leads to the
inference that in some instances they are actually using cyber technology as a weapon. In
response, Japan has only recently prioritized cyber security and is also exploring the
development of a malware system that could be deployed for self-defense purposes, although
there are legal limitations to their ability to do so. China and Japan, along with South Korea,
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share a cyber security pact; meanwhile the U.S. and Japan have very recently affirmed that their
partnership extends to the cyber sphere.
Throughout this chapter there have been allusions to different patterns of behavior
emerging between the two dyads. Comparing the two cases generates some observations and
inferences that will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
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Chapter Seven – Conclusions and Recommendations
In this thesis, I argued that a state is most likely to initiate a cyber dispute or incident
against a rival when the intensity of the rivalry within the dyad is moderate to high; when there is
economic and military asymmetry within the dyad; and when the two rivals are interconnected
through trade or bilateral agreements. These theories are based on what is known about how
cyber technology has been used to date as a ‘weapon’ and also about the behavior of rival states.
A multi-variable regression analysis was performed on a dataset that tested 77 cases of
interstate rival dyads against eleven distinct variables that were intended to prove three
hypotheses. The cases included 20 dyads that had experienced a cyber incident or dispute – also
referred to as a cyber interaction - and 57 that had not. Two case studies were included as well
that focused on China and the United States, and China and Japan, as rival dyads that have
experienced differing levels of cyber activity.
The results of the analysis show that the three hypotheses do not predict what causes a
cyber event between rival states. Based on the data collected however, there are some important
trends and observations to highlight:
-

The relationship between rivalry intensity, as measured here and the occurrence of cyber
activity between rivals is not significant enough to explain why states initiate cyber
operations against one another. There is a very slight positive relationship between the
two but nothing substantive enough for it to be explanatory. A suggested area for further
research on this variable is to examine if intensity within a rivalry was heightened at
moments when a cyber operation was initiated by one of the rivals such as seen with
China and Japan; acknowledging the constraints imposed by access to information and
attribution.

-

The asymmetry variable fails to explain why states engage in cyber interactions. A
different methodology may produce different results however. By taking the percentage
difference between the average GDP and average military expenditure of each state in the
dyad, averaged over a ten year time frame, the approach used by this thesis did not take
into account which state in the dyad initiated an operation(s), if both did, and if that is
connected to their relative wealth or strength.
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-

There are more cyber interactions between rivals that are of different civilization type.
Countries that are identified as Islamic and Sinic are the most cyber active among all nine
types.

-

The analysis confirmed the regional trend highlighted in the original Valeriano and
Maness data set. Most cyber active dyads are within the same region, with an emphasis
on Asia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This raises questions about why
there was little or no inter-state cyber activity in other regions during the time frame
considered. For example, are there certain pre-requisites for these types of operations
that are more prevalent in Asia and MENA?

-

There is a very slight trend of higher levels of interconnectedness among cyber dyads
than non-cyber dyads per the variables and measures employed by this research. This
might be another dimension that warrants additional study, particularly as it could shed
light as to why cyber activity, on the whole, has been relatively restrained in severity. As
with kinetic war, do close ties help avoid escalation?

My research yielded one highly significant result. It showed that the odds of a cyber
event within a dyad where at least one state is a nuclear power are about 10 times greater than if
neither is, and if both are nuclear powers it is 80 times greater. There does not appear to be any
correlation between a dyad having two nuclear weapon states and a there being a higher volume
of cyber events. There is, however, a positive correlation between which country in the dyad is
the nuclear weapon state and which country is the initiator of a cyber event. This was determined
by revisiting the original Valeriano and Maness data set shows that for 85 percent of the
incidents and disputes included, the nuclear weapon state was the initiator of the operation.
This does not mean that having nuclear weapons necessarily causes states to take action
in the cyber sphere. The United Kingdom and France do not have any incidents or disputes
attributed to them, at least within this data set. What it might indicate though is that there is
another intervening variable that connect the two, such as the strength, and power, that comes
with having nuclear weapons either gives courage to also take aggressive action in cyber space
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or that conversely, it can act as a deterrent and restraint, or simply indicates a high level of
technological achievement. Possession of nuclear weapons is an intervening variable.
A comparison of the two case studies presented in this thesis supports that suggestion.
Chinese cyber operations against Japan tended to be somewhat more antagonistic or ‘hostile’
than those conducted against the United States. There are more operations against the U.S. than
against Japan, but a greater number of them are theft or espionage operations meant to collect
information in order to advance Chinese military or other technology. Some of the operations
against Japan have also been for this purpose, but others are meant to be disabling and correlate
to disputes or conflicts between the two countries. This may reflect that the Chinese are less
afraid of attacking the Japanese than they are the Americans; Japan is an important country but
certainly less powerful than the U.S. and currently lacks the ability to retaliate. Of course, it
could be argued that technically Japan falls under American military protection although it’s not
entirely clear how this protection would extend to a cyber attack.
Given the statistical result with respect to nuclear weapons and observations made from
comparing the two case studies, I believe that there is a need for additional research on how
power factors into use of cyber weapons. As noted in Chapter Four, power can be defined many
ways but typically involves some measure of military capacity, including through nuclear
weapons, wealth or productivity. This might lead to a different formulation or result on the
asymmetry variable as well.
This thesis further explored potential implications of the overlap between nuclear weapon
states and ‘cyber weapon states’ (a term used very loosely) and noted the following:
-

Cyber weapons are not replacing nuclear weapons because they are more acceptable.
There are significant differences between the two types of weapons and moreover, the
objectives and targets being sought after in cyber operations could not be accomplished
by nuclear weapons, or vice versa.
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-

The overlap between cyber and nuclear weapon states may relate to technological
sophistication or wealth, although not every nuclear weapon state is economically welldeveloped.

-

It’s not yet clear if having cyber weapons will become a power symbol, thus allowing a
privileged group of countries to dominate cyber security dialogues. A move away from
the state-centric realist model towards a more open and liberal international order
indicates that this will not be the case, as does the substantial role that non-state and nonmilitary actors play in cyber space.

-

Deterrence theory, as developed in relation to nuclear weapons, cannot be applied
wholesale to cyber space and does not need to be although it’s feasible that states may
look to what they know and recognize from their nuclear history to make sense of cyber
warfare and cyber space.

The ubiquity of cyber space and the rate at which it is being militarized leaves policymakers
and political leaders facing unique challenges in a largely unfamiliar landscape. The objective of
this thesis was to shed light on how, when and why states are using cyber technology against one
another in the belief that this information is vital to the development of policies and laws that are
effective because they are rooted in reality. Apart from the observations summarized above,
there are a few additional recommendations for policymakers based on this research.
First, bridging differences of opinion and understanding is paramount. This pertains not
only to terminology but also to wider approaches on the subject. As we saw in the China-U.S.
case study, two very powerful actors who are very active in cyber space have fundamentally
different interpretations as to what ‘cyber security’ includes. They also differ on what is and is
not acceptable behavior. Other actors have yet additional interpretations. This is a stumbling
block for multi-lateral initiatives including defensive ones.
Second, and related to the point above, is the need to reconcile the multiplicity of
approaches to the cyber sphere and ‘what to do’ about it. Part of what makes it difficult to find
agreement on terminology is that every state or entity comes to the cyber issue from a different
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perspective, in the same way that they approach any other issue of common concern. This breeds
dispute as to what the ultimate policy goal should be. Is the ideal to prevent the militarization of
cyber space? Is it to accept that that may be impossible and instead develop guidelines and codes
of conduct to regulate use? Is it better to prioritize cyber crime over interstate cyber warfare or
the acts of non-state actors over that of government actors? Further complicating matters are
varying perspectives on the applicability of international law and international humanitarian law
to cyber space. The last few years have seen a proliferation of agreements and discussion fora
being convened on the broader cyber issue. This includes regional declarations and conventions
from ASEAN and the African Union; the Group of Governmental Experts on Information
Communications Technology convened at the United Nations; the Chinese-American Working
Group described in this thesis and the London Process of meetings, among others. There is a
Cybercrime Convention in place and Russia and China continue to push for a global cyber
weapons treaty in the context of the UN. NATO very recently declared that its Article V will be
extended to cyber attacks. Some of these initiatives are very different from one another and
address different aspects of cyber security, yet others are overlapping and do not have a clearly
articulated purpose. At this stage it is definitely helpful to have spaces for dialogue in order to
arrive at the mutual understanding and agreement such as mentioned in my first
recommendation, yet there is also a danger of too much talk, and not enough action, or of overlap
and contradiction.
Finally, the non-state dimension of cyber security is highly important. It is also multidimensional. For example, there are non-state actors such APT1 who become proxies for
government operations. China is not the only state that employs this approach. Then there are
non-state actors that are independent of government sponsorship or patriotic motivations. As
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with many other issues, how to engage these groups meaningfully is a challenge for the
international community. There is a perpetual worry about cyber terrorism and how to curtail it,
as with all forms of terrorism. On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are non-state actors
whose expertise in computer engineering and software is vital to building stronger defenses.
Including these experts and technicians in policy dialogues is absolutely critical. Yet in some
fora they are shut out in favor of politicians or diplomats with very little technical or subject
matter knowledge. This needs to change.
This thesis undertook to prove what causes a cyber interaction between two rival states.
While there is extensive analysis and writing about specific cyber incidents - which has
generated some common ideas about the reasons why states conduct them – there is very little
quantitative analysis available to support any theories about use or predict future action, despite
the growing importance of the cyber domain. This thesis has made an important contribution in
furthering research on the subject in a scientific and quantifiable way and within an international
relations framework. While the theories put forward were ultimately shown to have no
explanatory power, ruling them out as possibilities is still an important step in better
understanding why states engage in cyber acts against one other. The analysis led to other
observations and findings that can become a basis for future research.
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Appendix 1: Cyber Rivalry Dataset Codebook

dyad
dyad_name
riv_num
rival_a
cow_code_a
avg_gdp_a_09
avg_gdp_a_11
avg_mil_a
rival_b
cow_code_b
avg_gdp_b_09
avg_gdp_b_11
avg_mil_b
cyber_interaction

cyber_disp_count
incident_count
proto

strat

endur

nonriv

severity

Dyad identifier
Names of the countries in the dyad
Unique rivalry number from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)
Name of rival a
Correlates of War country code for rival a
Average 2001-2009 GDP of rival a measured in current
millions USD
Average 2001-2011 GDP of rival a measured in current
millions USD
Average 2001-2009 military expenditure of rival a measured in
millions USD at 2011 prices
Name of rival b
Correlates of War country code for rival b
Average 2001 – 2009 GDP of rival b measured in current
millions USD
Average 2001 – 2011 GDP of rival b measured in current
millions USD
Average 2001-2009 military expenditures of rival a measured
in millions USD at 2011 prices
Existence of a cyber interaction (either dispute or incident)
within the dyad 2001-2011
0 No
1 Yes
Count of cyber disputes experienced within the dyad 2001-2011
Count of cyber incidents within the dyad 2001-2011
Rivalry type is a proto rivalry
0 No
1 Yes
Rivalry type is a strategic rivalry
0 No
1 Yes
Rivalry type is an enduring rivalry
0 No
1 Yes
The dyad as not a rival according to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s
(2006) definition
0 No
1 Yes
Average severity level of all cyber interactions (disputes and
incidents) within the dyad 2001-2011 adapted from Valeriano
and Maness (YEAR)
1 Minimal damage (State dept website down, most
defacements)
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gdp_diff
mil_diff_20012009
terr_disp_pre2001

terr_disp_20012011

terr_disp

wto_disp

mids_count

hist_rivalry_days
rivalry_intensity1

rivalry_intensity2

rivalry_intensity3

rivalry_intensity4

treaty_count
a_import_from_b
b_import_from_a

2 Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or military (financial
sector blip, DoD hacked)
3 Dramatic effect on a country's specific strategy, (Stuxnet,
Flame, jet plans, R & D)
4 Dramatic effect on entire country or large region (Power grid
down, stock market collapse)
5 Devastating effect on country, (Catastrophe)
Percentage difference between the average GDP of rival a and
of rival b 2001-2009
Percentage difference between average military expenditure of
rival a and of rival b 2001-2009
Existence of a territorial dispute within the dyad before 2001
0 No
1 Yes
Existence of a territorial dispute within the dyad 2001-2011
0 No
1 Yes
Existence of at least one territorial dispute 1945 onwards
0 No
1 Yes
Existence of a trade dispute at the World Trade Organization
within the dyad 2001-2011
0 No
1 Yes
Count of Militarized Interstate Disputes experienced by the
dyad pre-2001 based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl data set
riv5.10all
Length of the rivalry in days based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl
data set riv5.10all
Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes pre 2001,
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one)
Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes 2001-2011,
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one)
Intensity of the rivalry (mean of territorial disputes since 1945
wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days, and mids_count, each scaled with
a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one)
Intensity of the rivalry (mean of wto_disp, hist_rivalry_days,
and mids_count, each scaled with a minimum value of zero and
a maximum of one)
Count of bilateral treaties between the two countries in the dyad
based on the World Treaty Index
Country a’s imports from country b in current millions USD,
2001-2009 average from Barbieri and Keshk (2012)
Country b’s imports from country a in current millions USD,
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a_trade_depend_on_b
b_trade_depend_on_a
trade_interdepend
trade_interdepend2

civ_a

civ_b

civ_diff

nuclear

region_diff

2001-2009 average from Barbieri and Keshk (2012)
Country a’s trade dependence on country b in currents millions
USD 2001-2009 (a_import_from_b / avg_gdp_a_09)
Country b’s trade dependence on country a in currents millions
USD 2001-2009 (b_import_from_a / avg_gdp_b_09)
Trade interdependence (sum of a_trade_depend_on_b and
b_trade_depend_on_a)
Trade interdependence (sum of a_trade_depend_on_b and
b_trade_depend_on_a, then scaled with a minimum value of
zero and a maximum of one)
Civilization type of country a
1 African
2 Buddhist
3 Hindu
4 Islamic
5 Japanese
6 Latin American
7 Orthodox
8 Sinic
9 Western
10 Other
Civilization type of country b
1 African
2 Buddhist
3 Hindu
4 Islamic
5 Japanese
6 Latin American
7 Orthodox
8 Sinic
9 Western
10 Other
Civilizational difference
0 same
1 different
Dyadic possession of nuclear weapons
0 Neither rival has nuclear weapons
1 One rival has nuclear weapons
2 Both rivals have nuclear weapons
Rivals are from different geographic regions
0 Same
1 Different
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dyad
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
15
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

dyad_name
North Korea -Japan
Russia - Georgia
US - Iran
China - Japan
India - Bangladesh
China - Vietnam
US - Syria
Iraq - Kuwait
South Korea - Japan
China - Philippines
US - North Korea
US - China
China - Taiwan
North Korea - South Korea
Lebanon - Israel
India - Pakistan
US - Russia
Iran - Israel
Russia - Estonia
China - India
Canada - Russia
US - Afghanistan
Vietnam - Philippines
Taiwan - Japan
Taiwan - Vietnam
Russia - Latvia
Russia - Turkey
Russia - Azerbaijan
China - North Korea
Russia - Ukraine
Netherlands - Iraq
Italy - Iraq
Iraq - Egypt
France - Iraq
Iraq - UAE
US- Iraq
Greece - Iraq
Iran - Turkey
Iran - Afghanistan
US - Canada
Iraq - Saudi Arabia
Thailand - Vietnam
US - Cuba
Turkey - Iraq
UK - Iraq
Turkey - Syria
Afghanistan - Pakistan
Iraq - Israel
UK - Russia
Iran - Iraq
Russia - Japan
Guinea - Liberia
Chad - Rwanda
Liberia - Nigeria
Guinea - Sierra Leone
Trinidad - Venezuela
DRC - Rwanda
Djibouti - Eritrea
Eritrea - Yemen
Tanzania - Burundi
Congo - Angola
Eritrea - Sudan
DRC - Angola
Saudi Arabia - Yemen
Albania - Greece
Nicaragua - Colombia
Belize - Guatemala
Albania - Macedonia
Poland - Russia
Armenia - Turkey
PNG - Solomon Islands
Afghanistan - Kyrgyzstan
Afghanistan - Tajikistan
Afghanistan - Uzbekistan
Armenia - Azerbaijan
Liberia - Sierra Leone
Sudan - Egypt
Uganda - Rwanda
Germany - Iraq
Colombia - Venezuela
Cameroon - Nigeria
Russia - Afghanistan
Nicaragua - Costa Rica
Ecuador - Peru
DRC - Uganda
Guyana - Suriname
Uganda - Sudan
Ethiopia - Sudan
Venezuela - Guyana
Uganda - Kenya
Congo - DRC
Greece - Turkey
Honduras - Nicaragua
Russia - Norway
Thailand - Cambodia
Croatia - BiH
Saudi Arabia - Qatar
Argentina - Yugoslavia
Poland - Yugoslavia
Czech Republic-Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia - Russia
Yugoslavia - Lithuania
Canada - Yugoslavia
Portugal - Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia - Norway
Yugoslavia - Denmark
Yugoslavia - Iceland
Macedonia - Yugoslavia
USA - Yugoslavia
UK - Yugoslavia
Netherlands - Yugoslavia
Belgium - Yugoslavia
France - Yugoslavia
Spain - Yugoslavia
Germany - Yugoslavia
Italy - Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia - Greece
Yugoslavia - Turkey
Yugoslavia - Romania
Croatia - Yugoslavia
Hungary - Yugoslavia
Austria - Yugoslavia
Albania - Yugoslavia

riv_num
1324
983
85
11298
1340
1306
92
1230
1330
1309
104
10101
11292
1323
1253
1339
77

127
97
1362
1316
1318
978
1001
984
1294
982
497
866
1220
579
1233
89
931
1187
1199
1
11229
1351
4
11208
463
11212
1285
11227
439
11189
11014
1067
1092
1071
1068
182
1101
1137
1145
1126
1096
1144
1103
1272
887
237
202
881
765
1029
1375
1282
1281
1283
1027
1070
1185
1111
716
257
1081
1009
234
295
1100
10290
11117
1140
10273
1108
1095
930
10220
991
1349
892
1274
378
761
831
906
908
121
10635
914
915
916
890
70
427
493
510
550
613
683
839
896
920
902
891
813
803
885

rival_a
North Korea
Russia
US
China
India
China
US
Iraq
South Korea
China
US
US
China
North Korea
Lebanon
India
US
Iran
Russia
China
Canada
US
Vietnam
Taiwan
Taiwan
Russia
Russia
Russia
China
Russia
Netherlands
Italy
Iraq
France
Iraq
US
Greece
Iran
Iran
US
Iraq
Thailand
US
Turkey
UK
Turkey
Afghanistan
Iraq
UK
Iran
Russia
Guinea
Chad
Liberia
Guinea
Trinidad & Tobago
DRC
Djibouti
Eritrea
Tanzania
Congo
Eritrea
DRC
Saudi Arabia
Albania
Nicaragua
Belize
Albania
Poland
Armenia
PNG
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Armenia
Liberia
Sudan
Uganda
Germany
Colombia
Cameroon
Russia
Nicaragua
Ecuador
DRC
Guyana
Uganda
Ethiopia
Venezuela
Uganda
Congo
Greece
Honduras
Russia
Thailand
Croatia
Saudi Arabia
Argentina (160)
Poland (290)
Czech Republic (316)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Canada (20)
Portugal (235)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Macedonia (343)
USA (2)
UK (200)
Netherlands (210)
Belgium (211)
France (220)
Spain (230)
Germany (255)
Italy (325)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Croatia (344)
Hungary
Austria
Albania (339)

cow_code_a
731
365
2
710
750
710
2
645
730
710
2
2
710
731
660
750
2
630
365
710
20
2
816
713
713
365
365
365
710
365
210
325
645
220
645
2
350
630
630
2
645
800
2
640
200
640
700
645
200
630
365
438
483
450
438
490
522
531
510
484
531
490
670
339
93
80
339
290
371
910
700
700
700
371
450
625
500
255
100
471
365
93
130
490
110
500
530
101
500
484
350
91
365
800
344
670

avg_gdp_a_09

avg_gdp_a_11

845483.25
12464806
2702867
851552
2702867
12464806
51664.16797
784177
2702867
12464806
12464806
2702867

997640
12888600
338240
1012665.455
338240
12888600
62461.75
839630
338240
12888600
12888600
338240

23670.77734
851552
12464806
218081.1094
845483.25
2702867
1109434.5
12464806
57898.10938
350833.4375
350833.4375
845483.25
845483.25
845483.25
2702867
845483.25
640688.6875
1752308.625
51664.16797
2123544.5
51664.16797
12464806
244404.5625
218081.1094
218081.1094
12464806
51664.16797
190344.4375
12464806
458780.5625
2172944.75
458780.5625
7343.375
51664.16797
2172944.75
218081.1094
845483.25
3600
5060
616.222229
3600
16140
7961.333496
758.333313
1147.111084
14010
6420
1147.111084
7961.333496
294368.3438
8287.555664
5006.555664
1130
8287.555664
321040
5740
5200
7343.375
7343.375
7343.375
5740
616.222229
31590
9770
2778.620117
155250
16740
845483.25
5006.555664
37491.77734
7961.333496
1460
9770
15610
178000
9770
6420
244404.5625
10370
845483.25
190340
45800
294368.3438

26702.81818
1012665.455
12888600
258651.2727
997640
338240
1210970
12888600
67840
372000
372000
997640
997640
997640
338240
997640
673195.2727
1824690
62461.75
2225720
62461.75
12888600
256099.81
258651.2727
258651.2727
12888600
62461.75
215580
12888600
511600
2207970
511600
7428.8
62461.75
2207970
258651.2727
997640
3790
57971.81818
699
3790
17061.90909
9096.454545
838.272727
1367
15617
77143.63636
1367
9096.454545
332540
9070.727273
5335.272727
1185.181818
9070.727273
353682.3636
6470
6159.181818
7428.8
7428.8
7428.8
6470
699
37548.45455
3472.454545
2902.06
182559.6364
15929.54545
997640
5335.272727
41882.90909
10990.90909
1630
10990.90909
10990.90909
200462.7273
10990.90909
77143.63636
256099.81
11450
997640
215580
48830
332540

avg_mil_a rival_b
Japan
Georgia
Iran
Japan
Bangladesh
Vietnam
Syria
Kuwait
Japan
Philippines
North Korea
China
Taiwan
South Korea
1334.33337 Israel
35519.8906 Pakistan
558634.313 Russia
11795.7773 Israel
47862.4453 Estonia
78531.5547 India
18586.2227 Russia
558634.313 Afghanistan
1959.57141 Philippines
9792.36328 Japan
9792.36328 Vietnam
47862.4453 Latvia
47862.4453 Turkey
47862.4453 Azerbaijan
78531.5547 North Korea
47862.4453 Ukraine
12030.333 Iraq
41996 Iraq
2604.33325 Egypt
65159.7773 Iraq
2604.33325 UAE
558634.313 Iraq
9724.22266 Iraq
11795.7773 Turkey
11795.7773 Afghanistan
558634.313 Canada
2604.33325 Saudi Arabia
3904.31079 Vietnam
558634.313 Cuba
17243 Iraq
58023.2227 Iraq
17243 Syria
232.571426 Pakistan
2604.33325 Israel
58023.2227 Russia
11795.7773 Iraq
47862.4453 Japan
121.75 Liberia
222.020004 Rwanda
6.81111002 Nigeria
121.75 Sierra Leone
114 Venezuela
226.444443 Rwanda
50.5999985 Eritrea
610.333313 Yemen
201.818176 Burundi
119.17778 Angola
610.333313 Sudan
226.444443 Angola
37916.4531 Yemen
165.090912 Greece
45.1727257 Colombia
13.0816669 Guatemala
165.090912 Macedonia
8070.63623 Russia
289.363647 Turkey
58.3090897 Solomon Islands
232.571426 Kyrgyzstan
232.571426 Tajikistan
232.571426 Uzbekistan
262.777771 Azerbaijan
6.81111002 Sierra Leone
1732.66663 Egypt
329.818176 Rwanda
48140 Iraq
8869.5459 Venezuela
318.636353 Nigeria
47862.4453 Afghanistan
45.1727257 Costa Rica
1456 Peru
226.444443 Uganda
24.7000008 Suriname
329.818176 Sudan
466.727264 Sudan
3104.27271 Guyana
329.818176 Kenya
119.17778 DRC
20340.6367 Turkey
133.881821 Nicaragua
41560.3633 Norway
4182 Cambodia
1147.27271 BiH
37916.4531 Qatar
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Russia (365)
Lithuania (368)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Norway (385)
Denmark (390)
Iceland (395)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Greece (350)
Turkey (640)
Romania (360)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
Yugoslavia (345)
47862.4453
558634.313
78531.5547
35519.8906
78531.5547
558634.313
2604.33325
24698.4453
78531.5547
558634.313
558634.313
78531.5547

cow_code_b
740
372
630
740
771
816
652
690
740
840
731
710
713
730
666
770
365
666
366
750
365
700
840
740
816
367
640
373
731
369
645
645
651
645
696
645
645
640
700
20
670
816
40
645
645
652
770
666
365
645
740
450
517
475
451
101
517
531
679
516
540
625
540
679
350
100
90
343
365
640
940
703
702
704
373
451
651
517
645
101
475
700
94
135
500
115
625
625
110
501
490
640
93
385
811
346
694

avg_gdp_b_09
4450489.5
7084.333496
218081.1094
4450489.5
65554
57898.10938
33316.33203
81731
4450489.5
116625.5547

avg_gdp_b_11
4669870
8115.272727
258651.2727
4669870
73680
67840
38540
94470
4669870
133210

avg_mil_b
60582.332
485.566681
11795.7773
60582.332
985
1959.57141
2181.22217
4886.77783
60582.332
2382.88892

2702867
350833.4375
784177
147138.2188
114727.2188
845483.25
147138.2188
14548.11133
851552
845483.25
7343.375
116625.5547
4450489.5
57898.10938
18544.22266
458780.5625
20524.22266

338240
372000
839630
162450.45
128499.6364
997640
162450.45
15702.45455
1012665.455
997640
7428.8
133210
4669870
67840
19847.09091
511600
7428.8

78531.5547
9757.11133
24698.4453
16515.5547
6077.3335
47862.4453
16515.5547
384.666656
35519.8906
47862.4453
232.571426
2382.88892
60582.332
1959.57141
424.333344
17243
972.666687

92157.44531
51664.16797
51664.16797
113516.5547
51664.16797
192372.3281
51664.16797
51664.16797
458780.5625
7343.375
1109434.5
294368.3438
57898.10938

102750
62461.75
62461.75
133818.5455
62461.75
21741
62461.75
62461.75
511600

51664.16797
51664.16797
33316.33203
114727.2188
147138.2188
845483.25
51664.16797
4450489.5
616.222229
2960
1117590.75
1320
178000
2960
1147.111084
17300
861
37780
31590
37780
17300
244404.5625
155250
28190
6384.222168
845483.25
458780.5625
470
2909.222168
2760
17680
20524.22266
1320
113516.5547
2960
51664.16797
178000
1117590.75
7343.375
2192
86040
9770
1930
31590
31590
31590
20710.88867
7961.333496
458780.5625
5006.555664
298754.7813
6960
11690
54410

62461.75
62461.75
38540
128499.6364
162450.45
997640
62461.75
4669870
699
3472.454545
137092.8182
14439
200462.7273
3472.454545
1367
20335
990
47430
37548.45455
47430
20335
256099.81
182559.6364
31060
6999.181818
997640
511600
520.181818
3287.909091
3386.454545
21985
27962.63636
14439
133818.5455
3472.454545
62461.75
200462.7273
137092.8182
7343.375
24820
99694.27273
10990.90909
2265.454545
37548.45455
37548.45455
1630
32144.72727
9096.454545
511600
5335.272727
325552.7273
7948.363636
12730.72727
71836

1210970
332540
67840

3219.11108
2604.33325
2604.33325
4796.77783
2604.33325
10234.7773
2604.33325
2604.33325
17243
232.571426
18586.2227
35629.8906
1959.57141
75.1142883
2604.33325
2604.33325
2181.22217
6077.3335
16515.5547
47862.4453
2604.33325
60582.332
6.81111002
76.9545441
1544.27271
32.2454529
3104.27271
76.9545441
610.333313
1435.11108
88.6888885
24273.8301
1732.66663
14789.1758
1435.11108
9724.22266
8869.5459
215.454544
191.454544
47862.4453
17243
145.327271
42
74.7666702
8814.80566
32.2454529
4796.77783
76.9545441
2604.33325
3104.27271
1544.27271
232.571426
0
1671.18176
329.818176
1732.66663
1732.66663
24.7000008
568
226.444443
17243
45.1727257
6704.09082
149.181824
279.125
1552.44446

gdp_diff

mil_diff_20012009

122.93364
49.8300285
13.8063803
13.7441025
4.9858489
334.421387
1.51244557
5.56181908
2.53914881

98.57028198
47.35883713
1.296278119
36.06080246
40.07588196
256.1106873
1.876402617
2.452880621
32.9564476

38.1048965
1.09981084

7.113501549
8.048647881

6.08364439
7.88068724
12.9190893
1.59218562
63.5340157
2.99392581
1.21383464
1734.95044
1.96359086
12.5534143
5.48349047
50.2663078
1.95003915
134.293564

12.37738323
5.844650269
11.67166328
1.400124311
124.425766
2.210917711
2.575157166
2401.990479
1.216025591
6.186691761
4.997196674
112.7944489
2.775760889
49.20744705

9.70939159
10.7777205
29.2129192
2.14240789
35.6333275
2.87299347
206.343887
4.10010624
1.97795272
10.6432037
5.32389832
3.17777133
8.19061279
35.3491554
13.2745199
17.2974949
2.60079885
2.21319318
4.14095449
4.68091679
5.4220314
16.694767
196.12706
3.80976248
11.7491379
2.61960363
1.63073421
14.8756399
15.7747478
1.62647343
27.4677792
5.21411943
16.3530865
28.2336578
34.2174873
26.2069492
1.29596961
2.82072306
79.0726395
11.8404408
2.25942993
2.19368076
2.95942807
4.32189131
20.6566525
3.5638895
21.5232449
1.09806705
8.60619736
135.855789
4.65205812
2.3803091
1.38984942
3.41631937
3.41631937
122.983269
2.92466497
8.48062706
1.99765861
2.14609456
3.06444979
27.1225643
3.83560181
4.62915516

14.86821747
4.619352341
16.12543106
1.841844797
25.0197525
3.929903269
214.5018616
3.7338624
1.461794257
50.71894455
30.05636787
13.68100166
1.992430925
7437.125
6.620888233
22.27949142
7.905200958
26.13104057
6.341567516
1.212291241
4.529288769
1.26575923
17.87520599
2.885079622
226.7285004
3.77572608
27.23046303
2.942574024
12.06192398
2.351356268
2.275574684
203.6774902
2.838885784
65.31039429
26.42057037
58.90222549
196.3473511
16.46996117
1.159691572
5.930442333
59.58938217
1.600328803
5.537415028
3.110629797
33.54471207
4.73424387
2.76843667
4.28588295
18.48457718
2.857205629
4.846505165
205.7967529
1.147789717
1.45650816
5.253399372
3.712374926
125.6790543
1.722160935
1.900055885
1.179646015
2.963775396
6.199254036
28.03314781
4.110247135
24.42371178

cyber_interaction
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

cyber_disp_count
1
1
2
7
1
2
1
1
5
1
1
5
2
3
2
3
3
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

incident_count
1
4
7
7
1
2
1
1
7
1
3
23
5
11
2
13
3
11
4
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

proto
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

strat
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

endur
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

nonriv
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

severity
2
1
2.22219992
2.22219992
1
2
1
2
1.16666996
2
1
1.89286005
1.42857003
1.21429002
1.5
1.5625
2
1.92307997
1.60000002
2.4000001

terr_disp_pre2001
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

terr_disp_20012011
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

terr_disp
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0

wto_disp
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0

hist_rivalry_days mids_count
19200
12
3415
8
6544
11
7764
7
9143
12
8348
17
9420
5
14525
25
16818
19
18507
12
18168
28
18949
36
18963
27
19200
32
19590
8
19825
46
20350
59

999
1184
442
608
344
1853
2564
2235
1745
1350
3350
3350
3360
3363
3386
5261
6284
7279
7365
8293
14665
12460
13556
15749
15787
15945
19238
18483
21994
23568
51164
652
945
419
1470
1036
1743
1113
1378
1813
887
1539
952
1366
1257
2787
2768
1357
1371
2707
1366
1184
3142
2939
3609
3733
1886
3930
3212
7074
6324
7930
7628
77724
8830
8949
12223
10789
12049
11613
12474
16071
16053
16458
16254
1460
1002

4
4
4
4
4
4
10
4
6
5
3
3
3
10
5
18
7
12
10
7
7
8
17
21
19
14
13
10
22
31
53
4
3
3
4
6
4
4
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
10
4
4
4
4
4
8
10
14
5
9
7
3
12
11
14
10
12
6
6
13
12
8
12
11
34
22
17
18
6
3

treaty_count
18
0
68
45
26
1
35
1
62
5
1
54
0
0
1
50
0
0
1
15
7
38
0
6
0
4
0
0
147
1
3
3
2
11
0
26
2
28
15
393
3
0
40
18
25
12
1
0
16
18
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
3
0
0
22
5
0
2
11
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
27
3
0
0
1

a_import_from_b
183.6222229
81.27222443
147.6444397
144626.9688
141.678894
3473.953369
255.4666595
0
45478.15625
17058.28125
0.177777782
252562.0938
52279.25391
0

b_import_from_a
110.2833328
318.7733459
195.4155579
102629.9609
2072.881104
10075.83887
402.4677734
0
22587.40039
4678.62793
14.37333298
75545.61719
19720.5918
12.66333294

169.7688904
15483.44434
0
262.8033447
16064.72656
1182.317749
55

820.9577637
6133.106445
0
1019.474426
16430.17383
720.0111084
423.487793

38919.61719

14272.33789

322.0911255
2370.124512
209.8688965
509.0055542
8110.883301
827.1333618
2354.348877
192.2233276
933.4500122
0
10086.21094
123.4477768
1102.482178
3.708889008
267445.5625
0
0
0.100000001
481.3155518
2.513333321
393.7988892
4.559999943

834.7977905
14058.45508
745.8422241
1256.682251
12411.93066
92.21221924
346.4500122
4.03111124
371.4533386
3.035555601
1171.854492
21.07333374
3655.022217
0
188081.8906
0.280999988

7266.444336
43.10555649
6634.983398
0.26111111
0
0
0.614444435
337.6233215
13.42888927

393.6166687
2423.946777
209.7344513
942.5933228
1.090000033
0
3198.007813
0
6965.549805
1.320000052
0
1.363333344
2.696666718
67.1922226
12.23222256

5.073333263
0.05111111
0
0.932222247
0
168.9533386
470.0577698
11.48666668
42.91888809
48.70999908
9854.119141
89.04222107
1.177777767
42.9766655
13.97444439

0.230000004
18.91333389
0
1.015555501
0
481.1633301
58.17222214
2.507777691
5.371110916
12.55111122
3140.463379
0.974444449
9.125555992
0.195555553
16.89444351

0.001111111
0
325.5377808
1.548888922
0.913333356
1029.666626
336.8299866
7.984444618
238.9777832
327.6588745
51.80222321
15.19777775
0.102222219
44.41999817
1.172222257
470.7088928
3.98444438
1408.234497
76.59111023
711.3266602
299.1744385
1212.702271
154.7944489

0
6.318888664
73.09999847
60.70222092
261.9888916
3027.424561
5.26777792
111.7900009
67.44555664
861.0789185
0.538888872
6.936666489
73.58555603
20.22999954
10.67777824
60.49555588
1.936666608
733.2088623
67.23555756
1265.134399
1020.72998
897.0800171
712.2122192

civ_a
8
7
9
8
3
8
9
4
8
8
9
9
8
8
4
3
9
4
7
8
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
8
7
9
9
4
9
4
9
9
4
4
9
4
2
9
4
9
4
4
4
9
4
7
4
4
1
4
10
1
4
1
4
1
4
4
6
6
4
9
7
4
4
4
7
1
4
1
9
6
1
7
6
6
1
10
1
1
6
1
1
7
6
7
2
9
4

civ_b
5
7
4
5
4
8
4
4
5
10
8
8
8
8
10
4
7
10
9
3
7
4
10
5
8
9
4
4
8
7
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
9
4
8
6
4
4
4
4
10
7
4
5
1
1
10
1
6
1
4
4
1
1
4
1
4
7
6
6
7
7
4
10
4
4
4
4
1
4
1
4
6
10
4
6
6
1
10
4
4
10
1
1
4
6
9
2
4
4

civ_diff
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

nuclear
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

region_diff
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

hist_rivalry_days2
0.247027948
0.043937523
0.084195361
0.099891923
0.117634192
0.107405692
0.121198088
0.186879218
0.216381043
0.238111779
0.233750194
0.243798569
0.243978694
0.247027948
0.252045691
0.255069226
0.261823893

0.012853173
0.01523339
0.005686789
0.007822552
0.004425917
0.02384077
0.032988522
0.028755596
0.022451237
0.017369153
0.043101229
0.043101229
0.043229889
0.043268487
0.043564409
0.067688227
0.080850191
0.093651898
0.094758376
0.106698059
0.188680455
0.16031085
0.174412027
0.202627242
0.203116149
0.205148995
0.247516856
0.237802997
0.282975644
0.303226799
0.658277988
0.008388657
0.012158407
0.00539087
0.018913077
0.013329216
0.022425506
0.014319901
0.017729402
0.023326129
0.011412176
0.019800834
0.012248469
0.017575009
0.01617261
0.035857651
0.035613194
0.017459214
0.017639339
0.034828369
0.017575009
0.01523339
0.040425096
0.037813287
0.046433534
0.048028924
0.024265349
0.050563533
0.041325718
0.091014355
0.081364833
0.102027684
0.098142147
1
0.113607123
0.115138181
0.157261595
0.138811693
0.155022904
0.149413303
0.160490975
0.206770107
0.206538528
0.211749271
0.209124595
0.018784417
0.012891771

treaty_count2
0.045801528
0
0.173027992
0.114503816
0.066157758
0.002544529
0.089058526
0.002544529
0.157760814
0.012722646
0.002544529
0.137404576
0
0
0.002544529
0.127226457
0
0
0.002544529
0.038167939
0.017811704
0.096692115
0
0.015267176
0
0.010178117
0
0
0.374045789
0.002544529
0.007633588
0.007633588
0.005089059
0.027989822
0
0.066157758
0.005089059
0.071246818
0.038167939
1
0.007633588
0
0.101781167
0.045801528
0.063613228
0.030534351
0.002544529
0
0.040712468
0.045801528
0
0
0
0
0.005089059
0.005089059
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.017811704
0.002544529
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.010178117
0.007633588
0
0
0.055979643
0.012722646
0
0.005089059
0.027989822
0
0.007633588
0
0
0.002544529
0
0
0.068702288
0.007633588
0

mids_count2
0.203389823
0.135593221
0.186440676
0.118644066
0.203389823
0.288135588
0.084745765
0.423728824
0.322033912
0.203389823
0.474576265
0.61016947
0.457627118
0.542372882
0.135593221
0.779661
1

0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.169491529
0.06779661
0.101694912
0.084745765
0.050847456
0.050847456
0.050847456
0.169491529
0.084745765
0.305084735
0.118644066
0.203389823
0.169491529
0.118644066
0.118644066
0.135593221
0.288135588
0.355932206
0.322033912
0.237288132
0.220338985
0.169491529
0.372881353
0.525423706
0.898305058
0.06779661
0.050847456
0.050847456
0.06779661
0.101694912
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.101694912
0.101694912
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.169491529
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.06779661
0.135593221
0.169491529
0.237288132
0.084745765
0.152542368
0.118644066
0.050847456
0.203389823
0.186440676
0.237288132
0.169491529
0.203389823
0.101694912
0.101694912
0.220338985
0.203389823
0.135593221
0.203389823
0.186440676
0.576271176
0.372881353
0.288135588
0.305084735
0 0.101694912
0.002544529 0.050847456

a_trade_depend_on_b
9.61252E-05
1.18449E-05
0.053508725
0.000166377
0.001285285
2.0495E-05
0
0.057994761
0.006311181
1.42624E-08
0.020262016
0.019342149

b_trade_depend_on_a
2.478E-05
0.044996943
0.000896068
0.023060376
0.031620972
0.174027085
0.012080194
0
0.005075262
0.04011666

trade_interdepend
0.045093067
0.000907913
0.076569103
0.031787351
0.17531237
0.012100689
0
0.063070022
0.046427842

0.027950179
0.056210697
1.61486E-05

0.048212193
0.075552844

0.000199364
0.001242173
0
0.000310832
0.005943588
0.001065694
4.41242E-06

0.007155736
0.007253966
0
0.070076071
0.019294387
0.000851597
0.057669368

0.0073551
0.008496139
0
0.070386901
0.025237974
0.001917291
0.057673778

0.110934742

0.003206914

0.114141658

0.000380955
0.002803278
0.000248224
0.000188321
0.009593192
0.001291007
0.00134357
0.003720631
0.000439572
0
0.000809175
0.000505096
0.005055377
1.70069E-05
0.021456055
0
0
8.02259E-09
0.001049119
1.15665E-06
0.00085836
0.000620968

0.045016598
0.030643092
0.036339607

0.045397554
0.033446372
0.036587831

0.134681806
0.001784839
0.006705808
3.55112E-05
0.007189767
1.57796E-05
0.022682151
0.000407891
0.00796682
0
0.169529513
9.54586E-07

0.144274995
0.003075846
0.008049378
0.003756143
0.007629339
1.57796E-05
0.023491327
0.000912987
0.013022197
1.70069E-05
0.19098556
9.54586E-07

0.047966488
0.004060729
0.02915059
0.000630469

0.003344054
0.000197658
0.007847563
7.25309E-05
0
0
0.000170679
0.020918421
0.001686764

0.046917368
0.004059573
0.028292229
9.5008E-06
0
0.003782461
0
0.00156512
0.002142085
0
1.21989E-06
0.002042929
0.000377484
0.004132508

0.004422704
3.64819E-06
0
0.00081267
0
0.000573952
0.056718506
0.002294325
0.037981316
0.005877487
0.030694366
0.015512582
0.000226496
0.00585244
0.001903

1.32948E-05
0.021966707
0
3.2148E-05
0
0.027812909
0.000238016
1.61532E-05
0.000190532
0.001965958
0.003714401
2.12399E-06
0.019416077
6.72192E-05
0.006121175

0.004435999
0.021970356
0
0.000844818
0
0.028386861
0.056956522
0.002310478
0.03817185
0.007843444
0.034408767
0.015514706
0.019642573
0.00591966
0.008024176

1.93573E-07
0
0.01030509
0.000158535
0.0003287
0.006632313
0.020121265
9.44365E-06
0.047732972
0.008739486
0.006506727
0.010409437
1.04629E-05
0.002845612
6.58552E-06
0.048179008
0.00062063
0.0057619
0.007385835
0.000841326
0.00157179
0.026478216
0.000525853

0
0.004787037
0.000643959
0.020507507
0.005070998
0.017008003
4.71351E-06
0.015223245
0.030768959
0.010007891
5.51575E-05
0.003594128
0.002329394
0.000640393
0.000338011
0.002920954
0.000243259
0.001598169
0.013429504
0.004234692
0.146656603
0.076739095
0.01308973

1.93573E-07
0.004787037
0.010949049
0.020666042
0.005399698
0.023640316
0.02012598
0.015232689
0.078501932
0.018747378
0.006561885
0.014003565
0.002339857
0.003486004
0.000344597
0.051099963
0.000863889
0.007360069
0.020815339
0.005076017
0.148228392
0.103217311
0.013615583

0.007126515
0.000197658
0.009412684
0.002214615
0
1.21989E-06
0.002213608
0.021295905
0.005819272

rivalry_intensity1
0.112604439
0.294882685
0.067659006
0.554633975
0.580255985
0.348885328
0.051485963
0.15265201
0.634603739
0.360375404
0.177081615
0.463492006
0.425401449
0.447350204
0.346909732
0.508682549
0.315455973
0
0.5
0.5
0.020162446
0.0207575
0.268370837
0.268904805
0.268055618
0.272909343
0.050620012
0.274138063
0.281036526
0.275528729
0.023487171
0.023487171
0.023519337
0.053190004
0.032077543
0.09319324
0.049873564
0.074260429
0.31606248
0.556335509
0.076831132
0.073976018
0.365636915
0.389639854
0.131287515
0.360609293
0.366963953
0.101823628
0.163964242
0.457162619
0.889145732
0.02539509
0.021001954
0.018746108
0.028903229
0.038341377
0.030074039
0.02737217
0.039808106
0.041673679
0.026402928
0.029199148
0.026681693
0.028457206
0.02798974
0.034551419
0.40170157
0.361751944
0.02847865
0.034208328
0.028457206
0.027676666
0.058672771
0.069101602
0.094573885
0.044258229
0.058935907
0.056402534
0.030724391
0.098134726
0.089268506
0.113105275
0.089211226
0.734463274
0.405100673
0.072277695
0.12586686
0.114067174
0.096872039
0.117601044
0.115643881
0.261013746
0.526473284
0.499961615
0.504736423
0.040159777
0.021246409

rivalry_intensity2
0.112604439
0.294882685
0.067659006
0.554633975
0.580255985
0.348885328
0.051485963
0.15265201
0.634603739
0.110375404
0.177081615
0.463492006
0.425401449
0.447350204
0.346909732
0.258682549
0.315455973
0
0.5
0.5
0.020162446
0.0207575
0.268370837
0.268904805
0.268055618
0.272909343
0.050620012
0.024138052
0.281036526
0.275528729
0.023487171
0.023487171
0.023519337
0.053190004
0.032077543
0.09319324
0.049873564
0.074260429
0.31606248
0.306335539
0.076831132
0.073976018
0.1156369
0.389639854
0.131287515
0.360609293
0.366963953
0.101823628
0.163964242
0.457162619
0.889145732
0.02539509
0.021001954
0.018746108
0.028903229
0.038341377
0.030074039
0.02737217
0.039808106
0.041673679
0.026402928
0.029199148
0.026681693
0.028457206
0.02798974
0.034551419
0.40170157
0.361751944
0.02847865
0.034208328
0.028457206
0.027676666
0.058672771
0.069101602
0.094573885
0.044258229
0.058935907
0.056402534
0.030724391
0.098134726
0.089268506
0.113105275
0.089211226
0.734463274
0.405100673
0.072277695
0.12586686
0.114067174
0.096872039
0.117601044
0.115643881
0.261013746
0.526473284
0.499961615
0.504736423
0.040159777
0.021246409

rivalry_intensity3
0.112604439
0.294882685
0.067659006
0.554633975
0.580255985
0.348885328
0.051485963
0.15265201
0.634603739
0.110375404
0.177081615
0.463492006
0.425401449
0.447350204
0.346909732
0.258682549
0.315455973
0
0.5
0.5
0.020162446
0.0207575
0.268370837
0.268904805
0.268055618
0.272909343
0.050620012
0.274138063
0.281036526
0.275528729
0.023487171
0.023487171
0.023519337
0.053190004
0.032077543
0.09319324
0.049873564
0.074260429
0.31606248
0.306335539
0.076831132
0.073976018
0.365636915
0.389639854
0.131287515
0.360609293
0.366963953
0.101823628
0.163964242
0.457162619
0.889145732
0.019046318
0.015751466
0.014059582
0.271677434
0.028756032
0.27255553
0.270529121
0.279856086
0.03125526
0.019802196
0.021899361
0.02001127
0.271342903
0.020992305
0.275913566
0.551276207
0.271313965
0.271358997
0.275656253
0.021342905
0.0207575
0.044004578
0.051826205
0.320930421
0.03319367
0.29420194
0.292301893
0.023043294
0.323601037
0.316951364
0.334828943
0.316908419
0.550847471
0.553825498
0.304208279
0.344400138
0.085550383
0.322654039
0.338200778
0.336732924
0.44576031
0.394854963
0.624971211
0.628552318
0.280119836
0.015934806

rivalry_intensity4
0.150139257
0.059843581
0.09021201
0.406178653
0.440341353
0.131847098
0.068647951
0.203536019
0.512804985
0.147167206
0.236108825
0.617989361
0.233868599
0.263133615
0.129212976
0.344910085
0.420607954
0
0
0
0.026883261
0.027676666
0.024494467
0.025206387
0.024074176
0.030545793
0.067493349
0.032184068
0.041382048
0.034038305
0.031316228
0.031316228
0.031359114
0.070920005
0.042770058
0.124257654
0.066498086
0.09901391
0.088083304
0.408447385
0.102441505
0.09863469
0.154182538
0.186186478
0.17505002
0.147479042
0.155951947
0.135764837
0.218619004
0.276216835
0.852194369
0.02539509
0.021001954
0.018746108
0.028903229
0.038341377
0.030074039
0.02737217
0.039808106
0.041673679
0.026402928
0.029199148
0.026681693
0.028457206
0.02798974
0.034551419
0.40170157
0.361751944
0.02847865
0.034208328
0.028457206
0.027676666
0.058672771
0.069101602
0.094573885
0.044258229
0.058935907
0.056402534
0.030724391
0.098134726
0.089268506
0.113105275
0.089211226
0.734463274
0.405100673
0.072277695
0.12586686
0.114067174
0.096872039
0.117601044
0.115643881
0.261013746
0.526473284
0.499961615
0.504736423
0.040159777
0.021246409

log_mids_count
2.484906673
2.079441547
2.397895336
1.945910096
2.484906673
2.833213329
1.609437943
3.218875885
2.944438934
2.484906673
3.33220458
3.583518982
3.295836926
3.465735912
2.079441547
3.828641415
4.077537537

1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
2.302585125
1.386294365
1.791759491
1.609437943
1.098612309
1.098612309
1.098612309
2.302585125
1.609437943
2.890371799
1.945910096
2.484906673
2.302585125
1.945910096
1.945910096
2.079441547
2.833213329
3.044522524
2.944438934
2.639057398
2.564949274
2.302585125
3.091042519
3.433987141
3.970291853
1.386294365
1.098612309
1.098612309
1.386294365
1.791759491
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.791759491
1.791759491
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
2.302585125
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
1.386294365
2.079441547
2.302585125
2.639057398
1.609437943
2.197224617
1.945910096
1.098612309
2.484906673
2.397895336
2.639057398
2.302585125
2.484906673
1.791759491
1.791759491
2.564949274
2.484906673
2.079441547
2.484906673
2.397895336
3.526360512
3.091042519
2.833213329
2.890371799
1.791759491
1.098612309

log_treaty_count
trade_interdepend2
2.890371799
0.2361072
4.219507694 0.0047538
3.80666256 0.4009157
3.258096457 0.1664385
0 0.9179352
3.555348158 0.0633592
0
0
4.127134323 0.3302345
1.609437943 0.2430961
0
3.988984108 0.2524389
0.3955945
0
3.912023067

0
2.708050251
1.945910096
3.637586117

0.0385113
0.0444858
0
0.3685457
0.132146
0.0100389
0.3019798

1.791759491

0.5976455

1.386294365

0.2377015
0.1751251
0.1915738

4.990432739
0
1.098612309
1.098612309
0.693147182
2.397895336
3.258096457
0.693147182
3.33220458
2.708050251
5.973809719
1.098612309

0.7554235
0.0161051
0.0421465
0.0196672
0.0399472
8.262E-05
0.1230005
0.0047804
0.0681842
8.905E-05
1
4.998E-06

3.68887949
2.890371799
3.218875885
2.484906673
0

0.2511524
0.021262
0.1526324
0.0033011

2.77258873
2.890371799

0.693147182
0.693147182

1.945910096
0

1.386294365
1.098612309

3.091042519
1.609437943
0.693147182
2.397895336
1.098612309

0

3.295836926
1.098612309

0

0.0373144
0.0010349
0.0492848
0.0115957
0
6.387E-06
0.0115904
0.1115053
0.0304697
0.0232269
0.1150367
0
0.0044235
0
0.1486335
0.2982242
0.0120977
0.1998677
0.0410683
0.1801642
0.081235
0.1028485
0.0309953
0.0420146
1.014E-06
0.0250649
0.0573292
0.1082074
0.0282728
0.1237806
0.1053796
0.0797583
0.411036
0.0981612
0.034358
0.0733226
0.0122515
0.0182527
0.0018043
0.2675593
0.0045233
0.0385373
0.1089891
0.026578
0.7761236
0.5404456
0.0712912

